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# IMMORTALITY.

THE PRINCIPAL PHILOSOPHIC  
ARGUMENTS FOR AND  
AGAINST IT.


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## FOREWORD AND DEDICATION.

**I** MERELY wish to state here that in writing this little book, I have cared more for its matter than its manner. Almost none of it has been written with much reference to literary effect. If it happen that such of it as displeases you, shall please another, then we should all be satisfied. Anyhow, I herewith dedicate the little volume to all thinkers, and all seekers after truth. W. C. C.

Cleves, Ohio,

Nov. 25, 1904.







## IMMORTALITY.

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**I**N THE immediate sense, this is written responsively to the urgent request of an agnostic friend. In a sense that is far from remote, it is written too for the benefit of all doubters. I should not impose upon myself this task, if it did not seem reasonably certain to me that, when completed, it will be helpful to at least a few who have thought themselves out into hopelessness. This is presumptuous, I know, but I find justification in the facts; first, that I know as much about the matter as any other man, and second, that my mode of presenting it *may* have peculiar advantages.



It is my purpose to be perfectly fair in the treatment of this mighty problem. This will be easy for me, for, being an agnostic myself, I shall be hampered by no doctrinal, nor partisan bias. Although I do not know immortality to be a fact, I feel that I know a great many nearly incontestable reasons why it should be a fact.

I shall arrange the *pros* and *cons* in pairs, with the expectation of having some *pros* left for which there will remain no corresponding *cons*. Without anything further in a preliminary way, I shall enter at once upon the discussion of this greatest of all questions. I should think the ontological character of much that follows requires neither explanation nor apology.

## CON I.

**T**HE heartlessness, and unmorality of Nature. There is nothing else so

cruel as Nature ; her record is one of blood and agony. Such cruelty is not compatible with the existence of a beneficent God ; it contradicts the God idea.

## PRO I.

**N**ATURE'S "cruelty" is the consequence of the invariability of natural law, and without this inflexibility, all would be chaos. In fact, the bare *existence* of *anything* not subject to forces which we call law, is past human conception.

"But," objects our materialistic friend, "if there had been an omnipotent and beneficent God, he would have so arranged it that there would have been no suffering."

The answer is that neither self-contradiction nor self-transcension is possible even to God. Both are as impossible as that black and white should be simultaneously the same in appearance. God could



not create two adjoining hills without a hollow between them, for the reason that such a feat would have to depend upon his self-contradiction; i. e., *his annihilation*. This is because God cannot be rationally conceived of as separable from what we call matter. The completeness of our own material involvement is such that we habitually impute a sort of tangibility to even the most subtile abstraction. Necessarily we think in terms of the material. That we thus think, is easily demonstrable, for it is illustrated in every conversation we hear. In all our utterances with reference to the immaterial, we infallibly impute thingness to nothingness, thinkability to unthinkability. Attempt to define "unthinkable," and you will quickly catch my meaning. Thus: unthinkable. What cannot be thought; i. e., That which cannot be thought; i. e., That *thing* which cannot be thought. This truth will be found to apply in all our

thoughts and words having reference to the unthinkable, and especially to what is meant by the word "nothing."

We would better realize, right in the start, that we cannot get without the domain of matter. So far as we can possibly know, there is nothing but matter. *Not-matter*, being unthinkable, is without the range of human thought and experience, and therefore—with reference to us—does not exist. There is only matter. Further on it will be shown that there is nothing humiliating in this conclusion. Likewise, it is well for us to take into account our scientific limitations, and the consequent necessity of certain assumptions. Thus, we are forced to assume the existence of the atom, and of that which we have named ether. In this connection, only the latter will come in for consideration. This ether necessarily occupies all space, and so far as that is concerned, all matter. It must be the primal



basis of all phenomenal possibility, for it is universal—it is omnipresent. It is miscible with atmosphere, with all gases, and is at least relationable with everything. Its nearly infinite tenuity is necessary to that extreme vibratility upon which the conduction of light, heat, electricity, and, possibly, even thought depends. As it is universal, there is no void in the universe.

This is materialism, but its acceptance is inescapable, because not-matter is unthinkable. It is true that many a coming tangible reality has been unthinkable until exhumed, but this cannot ever be true of the intangible. One is unthinkable, because it is not yet in evidence; the other because it (!) is logically impossible. I say “it,” because I think and write in terms of the material, but there is no *it-ness* about it(!) Not-matter is without the domain of thought because it(!) is *not*. “Unthinkable” is merely a word, like “nothing;” neither of them stands for any-

thing but sound. The argument which is conceived to end *in* the unthinkable is invalid, while that which rebounds *from* it may be valid. This is it: with reference to the unthinkable, you are annihilated—that's all. We have to accept the materialism referred to, because it is within the bounds of the thinkable. But the bugaboo aspect of materialism vanishes in the realization that mind itself is material. Otherwise it would not be relatable to anything more gross than itself. That the mind is material, is susceptible of ready demonstration. Because it *exists*, it occupies space; it acts, and reacts; it varies in quantity and quality. All of these are physical properties. Mind *does* things; i. e., it *acts*. Emotion, or feeling—a mental phase—not only acts, but is susceptible of increase or diminution. You love Mary—that is action. You love Mary *more* than you love Ann; so then, love has *mathematical* relations. The terms "more"



or "less" are not possibly applicable to abstraction. It follows that the very highest spiritual experience is material, for it is an expression of consciousness; i. e., mentality. The *immaterial* is such, not because it is absolutely intangible, but because its physical properties are not directly evident to our senses.

Is this conception of the supraphysical, so called, cheapening, or belittling? If so, is it for any other reason than that it conflicts with your accustomed mode of thought? Even under the prevalent view of the subject, do you not have to concede that matter is as sacred, as mysterious, and as much *of* God (there being a God), as mind is? If this is so, are not mind, and matter (to distinguish between them) equal to the *same* thing, and can there be any sane objection to that thing being matter, especially as we can only think in terms of the material? You see, all of us

are, at bottom, materialists, even as we are agnostics.

There is no space, so to speak, between something and nothing. Religious people have absorbed from pulpit emanations, the idea that spiritual being occupies a place between the limit of materiality and the beginning of non-materiality; i. e., *nothing*. In the first place, a limit to materiality is not conceivable, and this fact puts it without the pale of reason—it cannot be reasoned about. In the second place, not-matter being unthinkable, is *unrealizable*, for the unthinkable is without relation, and reality depends upon relation. As entitateness cannot pertain to *an* abstraction (there is but *one* abstraction, if indeed there is one), the spirit cannot be abstraction. The orthodox religionist, mistaking a subjective *mirage* for an objective fact, feels that he has an actual concept of a nonmaterial being—an



unreal reality ! His spirit ideal is not material, and still is not nothing !

Dropping the partial digression : if this fixity of natural law is responsible for all our woes, it is also responsible for all our peace, pleasure, joy, spiritual exaltations, etc. There is a fundamental fact with which all should be familiar. It is this : All things exist through relativity. In the last analysis, a thing is what it is because it is *not* anything else. There is no positive evil ; there is no positive good. Whether a thing is "evil" or "good," depends upon the result of comparison. The theologists are to blame for the prevalent notion that "evil" is positive in its existence. The fact is, the terms "good" and "bad" are, in the end, sense synonyms. "Bad" is merely less "good ;" "good" is simply less "bad." The worst man in the world, is the least good one ; the best man, the least bad one. It is absolutely certain that every person living is just as good as he,

or she, can or could be at any given moment. The statement may seem a little startling, but it is a fact that the thrill of a love kiss is only another phase of toothache. Both, in the end, are the same thing—a state of consciousness.

The ultimate clincher—supposing one is needed—with reference to relativity, inheres in next to the basic fact of all facts—intellection. To think, is *to relate*, and there could be no thought if things did not exist purely by relationship. Thought is—next to life—the primal fact. It necessarily clothes all it touches with the spirit and quality of its essence—comparativity. This, even as it derives its existence—this essence—from comparableness. If it could be said that anything exists positively, it would have to be admitted that it derives its positiveness from relativity. The destruction of thought would be the destruction of subjectivity, which would be the destruction of object-

ivity, so that the positive existence of things is not true, unless it is true that *nothing exists!*

As things exist then by comparison alone, it is plain that the possibility of what we call "good," depends upon the possibility of what we call "bad," and *vice versa*. Evil and good being essentially the same, (for each represents merely a particular degree of the same thing), they may be considered as simply representing an ascending moral scale. Although an ascending, is also a descending, scale, in this instance the ascent fact dominates, for otherwise progressiveness would be impossible. We know that it is not only possible, but that it is an all-controlling fact. A thing is "good" (in the proximal sense) because it is integrative—constructive; "bad" because it is disintegrative—destructive. If the integrative did not lead, and compel, evolution would be impossible. The fact that evolution (a



constant progressiveness toward physical and moral betterment) exists, confirms the fact that the integrative and constructive principle is the dominant one in the cosmic procession. This fact is a beneficent one, and so we have *beneficence*. The idea of beneficence is inseparable from that of *purpose*. This results from the fact that a goodness is not intrinsically such, unless it is intentionally projected. What may be called incidental, or negative benefit, is merely an expression of that compensatory principle which pervades the universe. So, we say, "It is an ill wind that blows nobody good." The beneficence spoken of, is not incidental, nor accidental—it is the direct, and forced output of cosmic movement. As the fact of beneficence implies that of purpose, so the fact of purpose depends on that of a purposer.

The foregoing argument would seem to establish the existence of a God. A wri-

ter has said : "God, and the rest is easy." It has been seen that in the scheme of things, beneficence is in the lead, and that Nature's "cruelty" is Nature's *necessity*.

## CON II.

**E**VOLUTION expresses itself through the might-is-right principle, and this is not consistent with the existence of a just and merciful God.

## PRO II.

**T**HE objection held in CON II is ablatively covered in the arguments of PRO I, but a little more may be said with direct reference to CON II. First, it is considerably more than nothing that the spirit of grammar coincides with that of the proposition, "Might is right." Grammatically, might and right are reduced to synonymity, for their forces are qualitatively

coincident, and quantitatively equal. In the grand total of things, ethical results are in parallelism with this grammatical fact, for, in the end, *right*—owing to its *might*—prevails; whence it inescapably follows that *might is right*.

By a few, though, this reasoning may be considered a trifle metaphysical, or even casuistic. There are less abstract methods of getting at it. Pure materialism, as also pure idealism, ends in (annihilation) nihilism. Now nonexistence is unthinkable, and the unthinkable can have no relation to the thinkable. Their conclusions, therefore, are not justified by logic, for this is related to the thinkable only. The argument which loses itself in the unthinkable at last, is not valid, because there can be no reasoning interplay between the premise and the conclusion. The argument gets no confirmatory response from its conclusion, because the conclusion is not *related* to the argument.



The conclusions of these philosophers are therefore false. In order to establish our annihilation, they think they have to establish the nonexistence of a God, and one of their strongest arguments against God possibility depends upon the alleged incompatibility of the God idea and Nature's might-makes-right method.

Now, all who do not deny the justification of the universe, must admit that the law of gravity is right. Those who do deny it are without the norm, as proved by their extreme exceptionalism. They are out of harmony with that universal sanity upon which depends social possibility and even existence itself. The spirit of their final conclusions courts self-destruction, and is, therefore, self-annulling. All who are straightly sane then, admit that the law of gravity is right. Now if a brickbat which is not worth half a cent drop onto a plate glass worth a hundred dollars, the

latter will be ruined. Is gravity wrong in this case? We know it is right, though we have here—in a life detail—an untoward expression of its *might*. What is true of gravity, is true of all Nature's laws. All such wrongs, as we call them, result from a lack of human foresight; and, as beneficently happens, this lack is necessary to our development, upon *which* depends our happiness. All natural forces, and all human acts dovetail precisely into the great scheme. If a physical tornado is not *wrong* (and who shall say that it is?), a moral tornado is not wrong. Both are more than *incident* to the physical and moral economies, for both do good by clearing up the physical or moral atmospheres.

The strongest fact in proof of the rightness of Nature's might (which includes Nature's "cruelty") is expressed in the hither end of the evolutionary chain. The

more noble and refined we are, the more we shrink from the performance of any form of oppression or cruelty, the more we hate and abjure the might-is-right principle—as we understand it. This marvelous fact represents the white blossom of evolution—the culminative glory of natural unfoldment. Yet this spiritual delicacy and sweetness—resplendent phase of divinity—is the direct outcome of that evolution which we call “infinitely cruel.” Being such, it holds the essence of the travailing past with all its blood and agony; it *is* the past condensed into the present. And here is a miracle, for that stem whose joints mark æons, and whose texture is injustice and heartlessness (as we see it) blooms at last into the highest altruistic possibility. The blossom seems directly to contradict its stem, but we know this cannot be, for Nature cannot stultify herself. The rose never blooms on a jimson weed. Somehow—and the



subtleties underlying this pregnant "somehow" outreach human understanding—somehow altruism is the consistent output of all (as we think) that is the reverse of it. Altruism being right, Nature's "cruel" might is right.

## CON III.

**T**HE earth is the sufficient cause and source of all we have, or of all we know anything about. Everything comes from, and returns to, the earth; she is indeed, "Mother earth."

## PRO III.

**T**HIS is a stock argument, and is generally accepted as about unanswerable. The fact is, the earth, at most, furnishes less than one-half of all we possess and are related to. It would produce nothing at all if it were not for the sun. If the earth is the mother, the sun is the

father    Then think of the millions of other relatives the earth has, all contributing something toward her wellbeing. Note that to contribute toward the earth's welfare, is to contribute to our welfare. Food is "stored sunlight," and the possibility of our existence depends upon food. All in all, it is very probable that we get more from the sun than we get from the earth. We get something from the moon; we get something from the comets. They do not exist in vain. [Vain existence is impossible, for it would have to depend upon self-extinction; i. e., no existence.] Then, the starry heavens—think what we get from them! That unspeakable blue, with its awesome depths, and the far and resplendent suggestiveness of the beautiful stars—who shall measure the refining and spiritualizing influence of these? That celestial exaltation which is nameless for its supernalism, we get, and out of the vastness of infinitely repeated catasterisms

we catch the spirit—the silent *Te Deum* of the universe. We are citizens, not merely of this world, but of the universe. Man is, therefore, in the largest sense, a cosmic epitome, and he is not tethered by earthiness.

## CON IV.

**T**HE existence of mind depends wholly upon the fact of a nervous structure. The brain secretes mind as the liver does bile.

## PRO IV.

**H**AVE you studied this principle that we call natural conservatism? Do you believe that the squirrel—and in fact all animals which do not migrate or hibernate—have foresight? Do you believe they are provident, in that sense in which a human being is provident?—in a word,



that while, in general, they reason almost none at all, in this relation their reason is equal to that of a human being's? Does the size and conformation of their brains justify any such conclusion? Does the squirrel say to himself—actually *say* to himself—“Winter is approaching, and I must lay in a store of nuts, for otherwise I shall starve”? We know he does no such thing. He lays in his store under an irresistible stress which is wholly independent of squirrelness in *itself*. He does it just *anyhow*, and just *because*, so far as his little mental fraction is concerned. The same is true of the bee in the construction of its comb. Here is a piece of mechanism which is marvelous for the amount of subtle thought expressed in it. Did the bee, with its nearly invisible brain-speck, think this out? Do they teach their young how to do it? We positively know they do not. A young swarm may be entirely shut off from communica-

tion with other bees, and they will construct their comb just the same. Would it not be something past wonder if the mechanical ingenuity of an *insect* were so superior to that of a human being, that it could achieve a mechanical effect which is *insusceptible of improvement*? Twist, and dodge as we may, the conclusion that this *has been thought out for them*, is utterly inescapable. Science has it that the work of insects, etc., is “automatic.” That may satisfy science, but it is not philosophy. Philosophy is Intellect’s religion—Logic’s piety; Science is Philosophy’s *valet*. There can be no such thing as automatism *per se*, unless there can be such things as causeless effects. This “automatism,” as we scientifically call it, is, in fact, intellectual manifestation. The honey-comb *reflects* mind, and a reflected ray is only the *original ray* bent a little. Here then is mind, infallible mind; mind to which error is impossible, and who shall be dar-

ing enough to say *it* depends upon a nervous structure! Whence, mind without gray matter is not only possible, but is the largest fact in the universe.

This, and similar conclusions are objected to by material thinkers on the ground that they are the output of mental self-involvement. This gray matter effluence which we have named mind, is sufficient unto its own self and precincts only—it cannot outreach its tether. In a word, the conclusion that mind is possible without gray matter, is itself a *gray-matter conclusion*—the *creation* of a *gray-matter mind*. The point of departure from which it is derived is intrinsic, whereas to make it valid, this point would have to be extrinsic to our sphere of thought. The conclusion is the result of an ultra form of introspection, extrospection being impossible in the case. To reason competently in the matter, the ego would have to get



out of, and beyond itself—up into an alien thought atmosphere, etc.

The objection would easily stand if my conclusion had an eliminative instead of an absorptive, and assimilative origin. All I know I have absorbed from my environment. I have not evolved it from mental selfness. Included in my extra-physical assets, is my ability to reason, and this is derived from the comparabilities of my knowledge items, together with their inter-auras of meanings. General mind is the major fact. It specializes into simple or complex ideas to which it gives concrete expression. It has been said that "there is a thought behind every natural object." The truth is, the object itself is the *thought itself* materially expressed to put it within reach of our special senses. *Primarily* we get our thoughts from the cosmos, and only *secondarily* from ourselves and from each other. They must be poured into us from the source of

all thought, before we can pour them out. Without further expansion along this line, it is easily apparent that my conclusion in regard to non-neural mind, depended upon merely natural, unsophisticated, helpless receptivity. I, as a medium, simply bent the original, *incoming* ray.

But let us look at it from another viewpoint. I think I can safely posit as a basic proposition that *reasoning is reasoning*. It follows as a corollary that, *other things being equal, a particular deduction of a particular mind, is no more nor less valid than any other deduction of this same mind*. Is the quality of reason in high C, different from that in low C? If it is, it will devolve upon our skeptic friends to show *why* it is different. That reason which supervises our daily affairs; that makes intelligence, culture, society, human government, civilization and life itself possible—when, where, how (and if it must be done), *why* must we put a check upon it?

I must still maintain that my conclusion in regard to non-neural mind—mind without gray matter—is legitimate, and doubtlessly correct.

## CON V.

Everything that has a beginning has an ending. We began at birth; we will end at death.

## PRO V.

In the first place, if we began at birth, it does not necessarily follow that we shall end at death. The grain of wheat undergoes a form of death only to spring into new life; is not man as worthy of a new life as is wheat? This by the way.

Living within the immediate, and the present, and in relation to the grossness of material manifestation, our instant judgments are superficial and circum-

scribed. We mistake seeming absences of evidential shades for real presences of positive testimony. Our immediate judgments are derived from the contemplation of only a fraction of Nature's clare-obscuro. Our relation to the ultra supraphysical may be likened to that of the water grub to the atmosphere. To him, the little pond he is in is the universe, and from all the material signs available to him, it is unthinkable that he will emerge from his humble estate, and on glittering wings, skim the invisible ether of an upper world. No dragon fly ever returned to explain the matter to him. He has been standing upon a *bare assertion*—just what the above *con* is. His mysterious disappearance from his nether world is darkly interpreted by the remaining grubs as his extinction, just as many of us construe a merger into that master *opprobrium* (as the resenting soul would have it), death.



It is undoubtedly true that everything that has a beginning, has an ending. What reckless man shall say his soul had a beginning? Let him study his lineage. Let him go back through his progenitors till he reaches the monkey. Did he begin with the simian? Rather he was almost here—nearly a man. Let him go back to the sponge, and then on to protoplasm. Was protoplasm his beginning? Nay, it was merely an epoch in his projection. Let him go back in this endless chain of cause and effect. Where will he fetch up? In the uncaused cause, to speak humanly ; in the eternal and unconditioned, to speak safely. Note, in this connection, that, in the last analysis, effect is but projected cause—note this, and you will better appreciate your royal lineage. You were *always* an individual ; then shall your individuality ever end? When I say you, I do not mean your body, for that is not *you*. This long line was the potential ba-

sis of *you*, and it never had a beginning. How can it have an ending? You have at last reached the exalted estate of self-consciousness, or psychic entity.

Here is another logical phase of the subject; No one will dispute the eternity of matter as *matter*. The various forms it takes on are ephemeral, of course; but unlike matter, as such, that self-conscious essence, the human ego, is incapable of decomposition into a general form of identical basic expression. The *existence* of the ego depends upon—not visible form or dimension—but *individual* self-consciousness. This is it: You can destroy the definition of a particular aggregation of matter without destroying the matter of which it is composed. You cannot destroy the definition of a mind, without destroying the mind itself, for its very *existence* depends upon its definition—not upon what it is composed of. Its destructibility would constitute a single exception

to the universal rule, that not *any* thing is reducible to *no* thing. Nature being consistent, if we cannot destroy any part of the basis of objectivity, we cannot destroy any part of the basis of subjectivity, seeing particularly that the existence of objectivity depends upon that of subjectivity.

The human ego is a mighty epochal manifestation in that lineage which, we have seen, is eternal. It, its individualism, cannot be extinguished unless an eternal principle, entitatively expressed, can be annihilated. Materialists freely admit that the human ego is indestructible in the *same* sense as that applied to grosser matter, forgetting that this is impossible, since the very being of a mind depends upon its definition. The *fact* of the ego, is the *fact* of its indestructibility.

If the ego were not eternal by right of origin, it would be so by right of its regality with reference to matter. What would

become of cosmic consistency, if everlasting duration were given to a lesser, and denied to a greater? Finally, the ego is unending by virtue of its constitution. There is nothing in its texture that is susceptible to erosion, oxydation, sepsis, or any form of material degeneration. What it is composed of is essentially eternal in its potentiality and its promise.

## CON VI.

**M**ATTER is indestructible. Being indestructible, it is uncreatable. Therefore it was never created. Hence there never was, and is not now, a Creator.

## PRO VI.

**R**IGOROUS, cruel, and implacable as this *con* seems to be at first blush, it is quite a spineless and harmless piece of logic so far as its eschatological bearing



goes. What if there never was, and is not now a Creator? That does not even jar the fact of God and immortality; they always were and always are. This, of course, is a bare assertion, but it has the advantage of coinciding with intuition, or more properly, human instinct. It is about certainly true that nothing was ever created, for to create—in the proper sense—is to evolve something from nothing. The proposition held in this *con* is quite unstable at best, for it predicates an all-inclusive something of what we know but little about. What is this elusive thing we call matter? Simply, *we do not know*. How then can we make it the object of a comprehensive asseveration? Finally, the *con* is totally invalid, for the reason that its conclusion (being unthinkable) can have no relation to the argument. Our materialistic friends must reconstruct it in some way.

## CON VII.

**T**HE results of environal pressure are generally mistaken for the evidences of design. The fitness of things depends upon the stress of necessity, and this inheres in the constitution of matter.

## PRO VII.

**L**ET me submit a counter proposition : Mistaking the *means* of design for original constitution, is a common mistake of philosophers. A man conceives the design of a piece of mechanism. The design is primal, and there it is at headquarters, unmaterialized. He proceeds to materialize it through environal pressure, which consists of material, tools, and muscular force. The movements and relations of these are made to be *subject* to the design, because it is primitively and motive-ly related to them. Now man is a micro-

cosm, and as such is a copy of the macrocosm ; i. e., he is the cosmos in miniature. This is partially true of all living things. This fact grows out of the assertiveness of the primal facts, *life* and *mind*. In him, therefore, the cosmos repeats itself to the limit of his possibilities. The cosmos is controlled by intelligence ; man, the little cosmos, is controlled by mind. The great Kosmos originates designs, and through enviroal pressure, gives them concrete expression ; the little cosmos, man, does exactly the same. The process could not be otherwise consistently with *consistency*. There is no break between the macrocosm and the microcosm—it is all Nature from top to bottom. The mind finds its objective correlate, not in the phenomenon but in the noumenon. It is seen then, that the design hypothesis is in perfect agreement with Nature's whole spirit and manner, and that enviroal pressure occupies a secondary place. According to this method

of reasoning, the design theory seems to stand.

About every skeptical writer has had a whack at poor old Dr. Paley's watch illustration, and has demolished its effectiveness to his own complete satisfaction. The fallacy of the watch example is established by the following stock, and standard argument: We examine a watch and conclude it was designed, and therefore had a designer. The conclusion is *correct*, but (for an unexplained reason) if we follow the *same* line of argument further, the conclusion will be *incorrect*. That is, our logic will recoil on itself! This by the way.

The materialist's great counter argument, however, runs this way: We examine a man and find that he is immeasurably more complex than a watch. He then must have had a designer. Following the same train of reasoning, *his* designer must have had a designer, and so



on without end. The demolishing feature of the argument is made to depend upon the *interminability* of the series. It cannot be denied that the series is infinite, but, (and I ask in all fairness) *what of it?* We do not quarrel with time, nor space, nor matter, nor even so proximate a thing as a mathematical series, for being infinite. Every chain of cause and effect runs back into the infinite, but we easily tolerate the fact. Can any one give me a fair and rational reason for objecting to the infinity of the watch series? After all, though, you do not have to accept this as an infinite *series*, for it is not that—it is an infinite *fact*. It is not an infinite series, for the unshakable and eternal reason that an infinite series of *infinities* is self-contradictory, and therefore impossible. Supremacy cannot be duplicated, for there can be but *one* supreme. The idea then, of a series of supremes, is self-destructive, and so without the range of sanity. There

could not be two Gods of the universe, much less a series of them, *unless* it is a fact that God is *not* God! Paley's series finds its natural and inevitable terminus and home in God. If it is infinite, it is only in the sense *that God* is infinite.

Finally, if there were no other objection to this materialistic argument, it is self-condemned and invalid, because, at last, its justification depends upon the unthinkable. Thinkability is such because it is not anything else—not because it is antithetically *related* to unthinkability. No relation is possible in the case, with reference to the unthinkable. The foregoing being true, we can think of, and utilize, the *fact* of the unthinkable, but we cannot think of, nor use, the unthinkable in *fact*; how can we deny then, the vast preponderance of evidence in favor of design?

All who accept evolution, must admit that “in the beginning,” so to put it, the

manward push started. Design being ruled out by grosser materialism, we are confronted with the irrepressible question, *why* did this pressure begin? The inescapable anti-design answer is—"because."

The manward stress persisted until man became an accomplished fact. No one will dispute that he had to exist potentially in the cosmos before he could exist manifestly as an integer, just as the watch had to exist ideally before it could exist really. There being no design, why—except just "because"—did he exist potentially in the universe?

According to anti-design philosophy, man is adaptable to his environment, or it to him, for only the physical reason that he is a product of it. It acknowledges that there is not only a physical, but a preceding intellectual, reason why the watch is adaptable to man, and he, to it. Here the logical situation would fall into this formula: The difference between

the intellectual possibilities of intellect and those of dumb force or matter, is intellectually favorable to the latter. The reason this is so is—"because."

The watch fits man no more accurately than the horse does. Man was capable of designing and making the watch; he was not capable of designing and making the horse. It required a capability almost infinitely superior to human intellect to evolve the horse, so the matter was taken in hand by *dumb* force, or matter! The reason for this is—"because."

No sane person will deny that design is the force back of every human act. Man is part of the universe, and he is saturated with design. Why does he have it, and where did he get it? The anti-design answer is—"because." The problem presented to the reader is this: How many "becausees" will it require to outweigh one logically certain *reason-why*?



## CON VIII.

Knock a man on the head, and where is his mind? Sound sleep also puts it out of evidence. It is a fact that mind deteriorates evenly with cerebral degeneration. As the brain is, so is the mind. Whence, the brain is responsible for the existence of intellect.

## PRO VIII.

The foregoing is the master *con*. This is because of the ego's close intimacy with, and constant dependence upon, the brain during all this life. There are two theories in regard to the mind's relation to the brain. One is that the brain produces mind, as the liver does bile; the other is that the brain is merely the medium through which mind manifests itself. Most modern skeptics admit that the brain does not create mind, except in that

sense in which a rose creates its color and fragrance. The rose is capable of specializing force into color and odor. The brain specializes it into intellect, emotion, etc. [It will not profit us to inquire here what the rose and brain themselves are, and where they came from.] The constitution of the brain is such that it can specialize general force into the specific expression, mind.

This is no better than the hypothesis that the brain secretes mind as the liver does bile, for it makes the ego as evanescent and unstable as is the rainbow. In effect, the theories are identical; so that I shall not consider them separately. The fact, though, that our materialist friends admit that the brain is only an instrument through which mental manifestation takes place, is a gain to be rejoiced over. Which of the two theories I have spoken of, is true? Upon the doubtless answer to this question hangs either eternal

hope's, or eternal despair's, justification.

According to the usual way of looking at this question, neither position seems to have any advantage of the other. Under either hypothesis, it is claimed that all mental phenomena can be accounted for. A crippled engine will give crippled evidence, though we know that the *steam* is not crippled. The same is true with reference to brain and mind.

To this, our materialist friend will object that certain conditions of the brain—as intoxication, etc.—change the very *nature* of the man; change him from an optimist into a pessimist; change him from a kind husband and parent into a brutal tyrant, etc. So be it, but is it not as reasonable that a balked mind should express itself viciously, as that a balked brain should do the same, especially when we remember that if the brain creates mind, it is superior to it? Intense indignation, and even murderous anger, are within

sanity, but is not its cause always something that has neither dimension nor weight, as the brain has? If a man insult you—*you*, I mean, not your coarsely material brain—who resents it, *you* or your brain? If your brain secretes vengeful mentality, what else but *you* causes it to do it? Which is controlling this matter, *you* or your brain—which is Commander-in-chief? Does it not look like it were the soul behind the brain which takes moral cognizance of things? Is it probable that if the brain *produces mind*, it *is subject to the mind's dictation*? If you object that the brain secretes not only general mind, but each particular phase of it, such as murderous impulse in a given case; that it does this without being dictated to, then it devolves upon you to show *why* it does it. It does not act without a cause, and the cause is necessarily something extrinsic to itself. The *cause* is *mind*. Is it your brain that gets pleas-



ure from beautiful music, or is it *you* ; or are *you* and your brain identical ? Your brain weighs between forty-six and fifty ounces ; is that the weight of the human ego ? It seems plain that the organs of sense are mere telephones, connecting *you* with your environment, and that the brain is the grand central receiving and despatching station, in which *you* are the operator. This easily accounts for low orders of insanity, for if any of these organs are out of order, and consequently send in false reports, you have generally no choice but to accept them as true, and you act accordingly. An intrasystemic disorder may give rise to the lower orders of insanity, but is it conceivable that insanity resulting from a moral cause, such as disappointed love, etc., (things entirely extraneous to both your body and your brain) should depend upon a bodily derangement ? Carefully examine the brains of these people, and you get no sign, not

consistent with perfect sanity. Why should not the mind (being an organism) be subject to injury? The effect will not be éternal, because the cause will be dissipated, and cosmic optimism will eradicate the scar.

Finally, the very existence of the brain depends upon the precedent existence of mind. This is because the brain is objectively related to the mind, and there could be no objectivity without subjectivity. It is equally true that the existence of subjectivity depends upon that of objectivity, but there is this difference: the brain might be wiped out of nature, and there would still be left plenty of objectivity for subjectivity to play upon; but if subjectivity were extinguished, there would be nothing left to make objectivity possible—it would be abolished. The mind can contemplate the brain; can the brain contemplate the mind? It is true that mind can make an object of mind, but that only

proves its vast superiority, for nothing external to mind can make either an object, or a subject of itself. A destruction of all objectivity except one item, would not destroy subjectivity ; whereas a destruction of subjectivity would destroy all objectivity. Thus, subjectivity seems to be next to self-existent, for it does not depend one-millionth part as much upon objectivity for its existence, as the latter does upon the former for its existence. From all this, it would appear that the brain's relation to mind is not primary, but secondary.

I submit the following as an axiom :

*An effect is dependently related to its cause ; therefore, to abolish an effect, we must abolish its cause.*

Although the truth of this is instantly self-evident, hard pressed objectors to some of its results will deny its truth. Some will attempt to show that an effect may outlast its cause ; others, that a cause may

outlast its effect ; others will take the position that cause and effect are identical, positing that, *in the end*, effect is but projected cause. Their arguments in defense of these objections have a surface plausibility, but are necessarily unsound. I will not refute them in detail here, for my space is worth more than the game would be. It is only necessary to submit two or three anticipatory arguments which comprehend the whole question, and invalidate any counter reasoning.

Thus : Nothing is an effect, unless it is *being* caused ; for what is it an effect of ? Nothing is a cause, unless it is *producing an effect* ; for what is it a cause of ? To claim that cause and effect are identical, (which they ultimately are) is to beg the question ; for it rules out all possibility of discussion. It is plain, then, that (in proximate relations) cause and effect are complementarily related to each other, and that the existence of one of them de-



pend upon the existence of the other. The following axiomatic proposition covers the whole question : The only reason why a cause *is* a cause, is because it is *causing* something—not because it did or will cause something ; the only reason why an effect *is* an effect, is because it is *being* caused—not because it has been, or will be caused. Understanding, thus, the nature and scope of cause and effect, the following argument will need no amplification.

The ego's distinctness from, and superiority to, the brain, is seen in the fact that we *know* it can abolish the brain, whereas it can be only assumed that the brain can abolish the ego—with all the probabilities against the assumption. A sufficient physical shock will kill ; a sufficient mental shock will do the same. If the brain is the cause of mind, we have here a *single* instance in the history of the universe,

in which an effect can become *reversely* a cause! All other effects become causes in a *progressive* sense. It is impossible that the ego can be simultaneously an effect and *retrogressively* a cause. As we know it can abolish the brain, and do not know that the brain can abolish it, we are forced to the conclusion that the ego is causatively related to the brain.

It is true that every effect is both an effect and a cause (progressive); whence the *chains* of causes and effects. It is true too that the abolition of an effect is as truly the abolition of its cause, as it is true that the abolition of a cause is necessarily the abolition of its effect. But here is the difference: The destruction of a cause is *directly* the destruction of its effect; whereas the destruction of an effect is *indirectly* the destruction of its cause. The brain is the cause of many effects, all of which are destroyed coincidently with *its* destruction—as a brain; the ego is the

cause of many effects, only one of which (the brain) is destroyed coincidently with its destruction as merely the *brain's* cause. It still persists as a most prolific and marvelous cause, though it is no longer a *brain* cause, while the brain—with reference to the ego—is totally destroyed. Its function in relation to our individual life is extinguished, while that of the ego is enlarged. I submit the foregoing as a fair argument in favor of the ego's separateness from the brain.

The subject of the mind's distinctness from the brain is of such over-riding importance, that a more extended treatment of it is urgently justified. Therefore, at the risk of seeming tedious, I shall consider it at some length.

“Other things being equal, the larger the brain, the greater the intellect.” The statement is inverse; it should be, The greater the intellect, the larger the brain. The brain is the answer, not the question,

just as the watch, the tree, etc., are the answers, and not the questions. The macrocosm and the microcosm are one, for Nature is self-consistent. The "decadence of senility" is a lie, told by a worn-out brain upon the intact mind. As the imprisoned culprit is shut out of social evidence, so the physically barred mind is shut out of manifestation. "Second childhood" pertains to man's perishable part. The mind's dependence upon nervous structure for self-expression, is complete. To the mind insulated by senescence, there is nothing visible nor audible; no distance nor direction; nothing but handicapped selfness. In these cases, there is no actual lack of mental co-ordination; the mind cannot do more than to respond to the distorted messages it receives. One in mid-life who is highly intellectual, but is only slightly handicapped—say by partial deafness—is often, by the exigencies arising out of this disabili-



ty, made to appear dull, or a little "off" to those who do not know him. Take away *all* his senses, and what chance has his mind to assert itself? We then call him mentally imbecile, although his mind is quite as vigorous and brilliant as it ever was. How many naturally bright school children who are handicapped by a congenital defect of the eyes, are pronounced dull by those who do not understand the case? The child does not complain of his eyes, for he does not know but what he is perfectly natural in this respect. Remove the visual defect, and the child may thereafter lead his class.

The condition known as trance illustrates, at once, the completeness of the mind's dependence upon, and its independence of, the brain. The victim is actively conscious of the preparations going on for his funeral! The body is practically dead; the mind is as sound as ever. Aphasia—amnesic aphasia (the other two

varieties have only a technical significance), illustrates the mind's self-sufficiency even more startlingly. For a purely physical reason, many of the words dictated by the mind are eliminated by an incongruous substitution. Who, that did not understand the nature of the case, would not pronounce the victim insane?

In cases of concussion and other forms of coma, the patient generally fails to recall any mental experiences had during the period of "unconsciousness." The usual inference is that the mind is abolished at the time, owing to the brain injury. Seeing that the most active mentation is compatible with a *nearly* dead body, why should mentative cerebation cease, while vegetative cerebation goes actively on? The inconsistency is antithetically related to natural process. Mind being the supreme fact, no natural agency can remand it to second place.

Memory seems to have almost, if not

quite, no dependence upon the condition of the brain. This is illustrated in a peculiar class of cases with which all experienced physicians are familiar. Such a case fell into my care not so long ago. It was a lady, intelligent and cultured. Without a moment's warning, she would pass into an alternate selfhood which was precisely identical with her normal one. She would often remain in this secondary personality for weeks at a time. The peculiarity about it was the circumstance that while in one state, she had no remembrance of anything related to the other. Now note this : so far as the lady knew, each of these states (with reference to the other) was a state of *unconsciousness*. This phenomenon is closely akin to somnambulism. While the somnambulist is profoundly asleep, so far as his brain is concerned, he is actively awake, so far as his intellect is concerned. Every faculty of the mind is keenly alert, often much more

so than in his brightest waking hours. Generally, he has no recollection of his dream. In fact no dream is remembered, excepting those which are coincident with the waking moment. This has been demonstrated unnumbered times. One talks in his sleep. You know he is dreaming. Next morning you tell him about it, but he remembers nothing of it. He talks five minutes before he awakens, but when told of it, cannot recall his dream. You awaken him *while* he is dreaming, and he can generally relate every detail of his dream. If one awakes by jerks; i. e., with semisomnolent interruptions, his dream, owing to brief lapses of memory, will be incoherent and unreasonable.

Sleep may be called a physiological coma. All other varieties of coma may be called pathological. But pathology *is only a phase of physiology*. All states of unconsciousness, so called, may be defined, therefore, as forms of sleep. It seems



about certain that no sleep is dreamless. While the mind has periods of quiescence, it never sleeps—at least in that sense in which the brain sleeps. The ethereal quality of its structure raises it above the needs of grosser organisms. It is well to state in this connection, that physical appearances during “unconscious” conditions, are not indices to the victim’s mental state. It is known that during epileptic seizures the patient’s mind is floating through cloud-lands of entrancing beauty.

The foregoing arguments and statements are intended to show that inability to recall mental experiences had during a state of coma, does not prove that at such times mentation is suspended. These same arguments go far in proof of the mind’s distinctness from the brain. But the fact of the mind’s intrinsic separateness from the brain, is susceptible of still stronger proof—a force of proof that is

nearly indistinguishable from demonstration.

Straight reason points to the ego as the essence and sufficient basis of all intellection. For technical reasons, it may be all right to distinguish between consciousness and mental manifestation, positing that the former *is*, while the other *exists*, but ultimately such distinctions do not exist in fact. The ego is one and indivisible. "Subconscious intellection" is merely a phrase, and it does not express a truth; for thought, without consciousness of it, would have to depend upon a self-contradiction, which, as we know, is impossible. Thought is simply an expression of consciousness, and from which it is essentially inseparable.

Consciousness perpetually radiates in manifestation. During our waking hours, it exists distributively, and is in immediate touch with its environment. This distribution dilutes its potency, as dispersion

of the sun's rays weaken their light and heat. The mind can be focalized by removal of environal distractions. Sleep, cerebral shock, the coma of fevers, etc., do it. The feats the mind is capable of while in this concentrated state, are astounding. It seems to me that there is nothing else within the whole range of natural phenomena quite so marvelous as mental intensity and facility when insulated.

The rapidity with which an impulse is carried from the brain to a remote part of the body, and vice versa, is very remarkable, but it is not comparable to the swiftness of unshackled thought. As a coarse illustration of mental facility (under focalization), even in the waking state: you shall see a lady who is an expert in music, sit at a piano and while another sings soprano, she will sing alto and play the piano accompaniment. This accompaniment consists of the bass, with obligato

trimmings, so to speak. The bass clef is different from the treble clef, so that the left hand plays quite independently of the right hand. Has the lady three distinct and separate minds? We know she has but one mind. What is the explanation of this triple expression of it? The fact that the music is new to the lady rules out that impossible subterfuge of ignorance—"automatism." We know that the lady's fingers could not have acted sanely if her mind had not been present. They could not have acted at all, if she had not willed them to do so. It is not supposable that her will was not immanent throughout the performance. The assumption that a willed sum was attainable without reference to its parts, is absurd, for it discredits intellectual consistency. The whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, but under the assumption referred to, we have a whole without parts—at most, parts in *kind*. Each part re-



ceives *attention*, and the *substance* of attention is consciousness, of course. The parts are not clearly remembered in detail, because such memory is not *required* in the case. The resourcefulness, economy, and providence intrinsic to intellection, are very wonderful. In such a case, the mind taxes the transmitting possibilities of the brain (sight, hearing, touch, co-ordination, etc.) to their limit.

The comparative slowness of sense telegraphy is illustrated in the kinetoscopic picture. The picture is comminuted, but the rapidity with which the parts succeed each other, exceeds the eye's differentiating facility. We get only the sum. Twirl a spoked wheel rapidly, and the eye returns us only the sum of the spokes. Here then (if the brain secretes mind) we have an incalculable *lack* of synchronous consentaneity between its mentative, and other functions. In other words, *the brain is not equal to itself*—it is at once inferior

and superior to itself ! It *creates* a force that is its *master*, and to many of whose demands it is incapable of responding ! Either this must be assumed, or it must be concluded that there is a vast lack of balance and reciprocity between the brain's different parts, as between the frontal convolutions and the nerves of special sense. How shall this be reconciled to Nature's consistency?

The mind can, and often does, overtax the brain. Brain fatigue is common enough ; "mental fatigue" is unthinkable. You study till your head aches, or till your "brain is in a whirl." Does the brain, of its own volition, do this? If it does, can you give any reason *why* it does so? Does the brain first secrete mentality, and then flagellate itself with this mind whip? Out of the intrinsicness of innate impulsion, we always say it this way : "*I have overworked my brain ;*" we do not say, "my brain has overworked

my mind," or "has overworked itself," or "has overworked *me*." The only consistent(?) materialistic conclusion possible, is that the brain *is* the mind, and that (just anyhow) it not only uses, but abuses itself; i. e., *it*, which is *controlled* by natural conservation, *controls* this natural conservation! In the light of true philosophy, the matter is simple enough: the mind, being an independent entity, uses the brain, and sometimes uses it intemperately. *Its* subjection to natural conservation, is as its physical tenuity is to the brain's gross materiality—say one to a decillion.

Only a little reflection is required to make plain to you the impossibility of the brain, or *anything else*, controlling *itself*. Our moralists give us very convincing little homilies upon the importance of "self-control;" and the "New Thought" champions add to self-control, "auto-suggestion." What avalanches of glittering, if

hazy, rhetoric we are getting these days upon self-suggestion, self-control, "at-oneness" with God, etc. There is no space between *you* and *yourself* for action and reaction, nor for the interplay of any sort of influence. To suggest to yourself, or to control yourself, you would have to be capable of self-transcension—a yelping absurdity! Such a feat would only be equalled by the physical one of lifting yourself by your boot straps. I would not abolish the popular idea of "self-control," etc., (which is environal control), but it is tiresome to know that most writers who scintillate so blindingly about it, take the phrase, in *itself*, so seriously.

Right here, if a further digression will be pardoned, I should like to protest against that false philosophy which has, of late, gained such a foothold amongst ready writers. It seems to depend primarily upon intemperate imagination, conjoined with inability to resist the fascina-



tion of paradox. This weakness is responsible for much nebulous fustian, which represents scarcely less than the crime of obfuscation. Out of hundreds of examples, I select one, both for its illustrative force, and on account of the eminence of the man who furnishes it.

A preacher of international fame—a fame justly earned—in a recent lecture, which involved the discussion of high art, said :

“The profoundest depths of mental life lie below the plane of consciousness. That which we interpret in terms of consciousness is always the shallowest part of our being, below which lie ‘the abysmal deeps of personality.’ ”

Now to be capable of *knowing* (being *conscious* of) this, one would have to be capable of projecting his consciousness (as if it were separable from self ! ) below the plane of consciousness !

Again, is it possible to interpret (a *conscious* act) in other than terms of consciousness? What other terms are relationable with the ego? Shall we interpret in terms of unconsciousness?

“The abysmal deeps of personality” is beautiful rhetoric, but do those deeps go below the reality of self-consciousness? Is there a single element of personality not in relation with consciousness; for, without consciousness, is there *anything*? Consciousness is not a *function* of selfness; it *is* selfness. What is personality but the sum of one’s characteristics, and what do these come from but the fact of selfness, and what is the condition precedent to this but that which we call consciousness?

In the same lecture, after having put the child above the adult in ethical insight, he says :

“A genuine myth, a true legend, has more of ethical and spiritual nutriment

than tomes of philosophy, than volumes of metaphysics.''

First, is it true that immaturity is superior to maturity? If not, and we know it is not, is it true that immaturity is more mature than is maturity? The lecturer cites the fact that the child will ask questions which you cannot answer. Is it not equally true that, when grown, he can ask these same questions, and ten thousand more, which you cannot answer? Is it not rank nonsense to deny that, except in the matter of innocence and frankness, to go back to raw childhood, would be to retrograde? An honest paradox is an effective thing, but see what fraudulent ones lead to.

What he says about the value of the myth and legend, is only superficially true. It cannot be profoundly true that the unreal is more psychically integrative than is the real. The myth, etc., fascinates and pleases because it *affects* to real-

ize the ideal. The ideal is the pictured response to the inventive and aspiring mind's outreachings. It is always beautiful—of its kind. The yearning for, or belief in, the ultimate *realization*—this more than anything else furnishes ethical and spiritual nutriment. After all then, it is an ultimate fact that only *reality*, that is, *truth*, satisfies.

There is another form of psychic excursion in the farthest reaches of which are caught hints of transcendent facts and possibilities, but such experiences are neither below nor above consciousness—they are simply *of* consciousness. This consciousness, which is the basis of the ego, is the most fundamental of all facts. So far as man is concerned, self-identity is the master fact of the universe.

There are subconscious, and superconscious, facts, millions of them, but we know this much only from *past* observations. What is without the range of con-



sciousness is unthinkable, and therefore, to us, is nonexistent. They can contribute nothing toward the ethical or spiritual nutriment of our souls.

Watch, in your readings, dear reader, and you will find that such false philosophy and metaphysics as I have just discussed, are not exceptional among transcendental writers, but are the rule.

But now further, in regard to mental condensation and facility: It has been seen that even in our ordinary diffuse state of mind, it will ideate with a swiftness immeasurably beyond the transmitting capacity of nerve fibrils. In startling contradistinction to the powers of diffuse mentality, as during our waking hours, are those of the insulated mind. Thus, if one is drowning, or falling to what seems certain death, everything else is banished from contemplation, and a review of one's entire life may take place in the fraction of a second. I had that experience once

in a railroad accident. Again, one may dream(?) the solution of a difficult problem which, owing to objective diversions, he failed to solve while awake. This is a common experience. According to current science and philosophy, the condition of somnolence is one of *rest*. The correctness of this conclusion is beyond question. Yet, if the brain secretes mind, see what a frensied paradox is presented in the fact that when the brain is asleep, perfectly idle, completely out of evidence, not capable of mentation at all, it is capable of feats in intellection far beyond its powers when widest awake! The resulting formula would be this: *The brain acts most vigorously when it does not act at all*. What are we to do with a theory based upon such a proposition as that?

I cannot refrain from giving one more illustration of the insulated mind's facile possibilities. I was suddenly awakened one fourth of July morning by the explo-

sion of a giant cracker out on the sidewalk. This explosion, by an instantaneous and infinitely occult process, became the fitting culmination of a climacteric little drama in which I figured as the leading character. If this dream(?) were written out, it would fill twenty pages of this little book ; and it was all elaborated in the fraction of a second. Fortuitous coincidence of the dream with the explosion, is excluded by the fact that such experiences are very common. Everybody has had similar experiences—I have had fifty of them during my life. Think what focalized mentality is capable of doing, as exemplified in the case related. *It can reduce the event to simultaneity and identity with its prophecy.* These cases illustrate at once the amazing swiftness of thought, the intrinsic resourcefulness of pure mentality, and a nameless quality that would seem to include actual prescience, and a sleepless stress of congruity.

Finally, the mind's independence of, and superiority to, time and space, marks it as—next to God—the ultimate and supreme fact of the universe. Its capability of eliminating time as an element of its expression, is seen in its ability to compass, in a single impulse, the initiative, the interim, and the event. Its power to put distance out of account, is seen in the fact that it can touch the North star as quickly as it can embrace the nearest object. Along with these deific qualities—if not a consequence of them—is the glory of the esthetic hierarchy with its eternal vistas of light and sweetness ; and beyond this—by ethical additions—the ego reaches that personal hyperionism which is its own evidence of its own immortality.

In the foregoing, considerable allusion has been made to dreams. I feel that the subject is worthy of further consideration.

Now, to dream—what is it? Does a dream consist in “the passage of a train



of images and fantasies through the mind while one is asleep," as the dictionary has it? Note, in this connection, that if the brain is responsible for mind, one has no mind while he is asleep. But let that pass. There are some far-reaching questions in connection with dreaming, which require to be answered some time, in some way. Are the elements of dreams illusions, or are they realities? Are they born wholly out of subjectivity, and is it a fact that the mind *surpasses itself* by evolving images, etc., which outreach its perspicacity and impose upon its credulity? In other words, do effects rise superior to their cause in this instance? These questions answer themselves through logical suggestion, but further on they will be more or less directly discussed.

Are dreams subject to one fundamental law, or are there different laws underlying different classes of dream phenomena? Owing to the comprehensive consistency

of Nature, as made conclusive by her analogies, does it not seem certain that dreams are subject to just one basic law? If this is true, all dreams are primarily cohesive and consistent, and the incongruousness of many of them, as interpreted by the waking mind, does not depend upon fundamental variations. This is true, because we know that in at least two classes of dreams there are no inconsistencies. If two classes are congruous, all must be so, at bottom, for all are subject to the same primary control. It is certain, as before stated, that whether one remembers, or partly remembers, or wholly forgets a dream, depends upon his mode of awakening. If he awakens suddenly, he will clearly remember his dream and it will be coherent and reasonable. If he awakes slowly, or by jerks, his dream will be distorted and irrational, owing to little lapses of memory. One will dream the solution of a difficult problem, which,

owing to environal distraction, he failed to solve during his waking hours. This is very real; there is no hint of fantasy about it—the dreamer awoke clearly and without halts. The somnambulist performs extraordinary feats while profoundly asleep. He does things with which no possible illusion is connected. He does them straightly and sanely. Here are two classes of performances which differ from the same in the awake state only by being marked by superior mental acuteness. If a dream is a dream, why then the *why* of dreaming is all-inclusive; and further, it is a fact that mind is mind whether one is awake or asleep.

We speak of the subliminal estate as the “subjective self,” forgetting that the possibility of subjectivity depends upon the certainty of objectivity. Mind is impossible without its complement—matter in some grosser form; and therefore the metaphysical phrase, “the initiative,”

does not express a truth. Its truth would have to depend upon the mind's possibility of self-transcension—an absurdity.

In dreams then, the mind is related to objects, and necessarily objects not of its own creation. Since, in sleep, the sense avenues to the outer world are closed, where do these objects come from? They cannot be memory products, for the insulated mind would take instant cognizance of the fact, and refuse to accept them as independent and original facts. It is true that the mind is an image-maker, and it is true that images are objects, but the mind is always superior to its images and always estimates them at their real value. Images, etc., never address themselves to the mind as having come from *without* its precincts. It is true too that in sleep the mind contemplates, and is affected by, *re-called* facts, but it necessarily recognizes them as such. It is not deceived, because "self-deception" is impossible unless rela-



tionship can exist *between*—one! Where do the objects which become related to the ego in dreams, come from?

I dream of my daughter every night, and have done so ever since her death, which occurred over three years ago. In many of these dreams she labors to convince me of the reality of our experiences as opposed to the common belief with reference to dream happenings. While under the stress of consistency, I am forced to admit the reality of dream experiences, the admission is qualified by the limited fact that the word "reality," in such connections, is narrow and technical in its significance. Thus, a "fantasy" is a reality, because it exists, and is a thing. I am not positively convinced that this qualification is logically essential to the sense situation with which I have connected it.

Withal, the question ever recurs: In your dream conversations, is it *you* talk-

ing to *yourself*, or a product of your brain talking to you, or are there psychic channels through which objects reach *you*? If the latter is a fact, is it not a very momentous fact? Does it not go far in proving the mind's distinctness from the brain? If this is true, is there any visible reason why the ego cannot exist independently of the brain?

Dream prophecies with their subsequent realizations are very marvelous. So far from being uncommon, it is not highly improbable that they are universal and without exception. A brainy friend of mine, who is a hard and uncompromising materialist, has informed me that all the great epochs and events of his life had been previously experienced by him in dreams. Many of these dreams occurred years before the period of their realization, or rather, their *second* realization. This peculiarity—to call it such—pertains to every member of his family, which in-

cludes his parents and brothers and sisters. They are all of them remarkable for the keenness of their intellects, and their mental and ethical sensitiveness. People of this temperament are apt to awaken suddenly and swiftly under the tension of an extraordinary dream. There are thousands of people who are extra-sensitive in this respect. I have discussed the subject with many of them. There are many more thousands who are only a little sensitive along this line. There are millions whose temperaments or awakening methods are such that they about always fail to remember dream experiences which they re-act in outer life. Perhaps there are few people who, at some period in their lives, have not had a vague and hazy feeling of having existed in some other world. This feeling, beyond doubt, I should think, has always resulted from re-experiencing a past dream experience. You *have* existed in another world—the

dream world. The Theosophists have it that these misty semi-recollections depend upon the fact of an actual pre-existence. There is no proof of this—it is mere day-dreamery.

In that luminous arcanum which is the peculiar home of the soul, what feats in intellection are not possible; what spiritual marvels are not probable? We know that dream prophecy is a fact. Is it beyond thinkability that the insulated mind elaborates life syllabuses, and by control of native trend, secures successively their practical ratifications? How else can dream-prophecy be accounted for? I leave the pregnant subject with the reader, to be pondered by him much, or little, according to his estimate of its importance.

I have said that the brain has nothing to do with memory. I think I have proved the truth of the proposition; but I wish to add another proof which has just occurred to me. The brain is the mind's junior



partner during life, but it is not competent to take care of the memory. Brain cells are utilized with every intellectual expression, but the moment the mind has used a cell, *it* (the cell) *dies*. There is no kind of cell in the brain, or any other part of the organism, that endures. Memory, therefore, cannot be stored in brain cells. The form (in gross) of tissues persists, but the fact that memory can absorb and retain peculiarity of contour, opposes the possibility of contour binding to, or in itself, memory. Memory is a larger fact than is form.

To a large extent, the ego is an aggregation of memories. To deprive one of *all* memory, would be to remand him to the helplessness of infancy. His *only* resource would be instinct. He could not talk, walk, eat, drink, or even think; he could only imbibe nutrition as the infant does. All we know, we have learned, un-

less intuition *is* a fundamental fact. We learn through thought and practice. To think is to relate, and relationship depends upon memory. Past practice would count for nothing, if memory were abolished. People have, owing to some obscure mental derangement, suddenly forgotten a language. Notwithstanding they had *practiced* it for years, they could not speak a word of it. Temperament, bent, perspicacity, etc., pertain to the germ, and their development depends solely upon memory. Self-identification itself depends upon memory. Mergence (abnormal) of most of the force essence of the several attributes into one—specially including memory—will account for the prodigy.

Memory then, is nearly all there is of us. Being fractions of God, we necessarily conclude that he is an infinite sum of memories. We, as individualities, are very considerable items in God's memory. God

being eternal, we as individuals, have to be eternal. Each of us is a sum of memories, plus our basic attributes ; and to be this, is to be an immortal soul.

## CON IX.

**I**F THERE is a God, it would have been only fair for him to have directly, and doubtlessly discovered himself to man.

## PRO IX.

**W**H Y ? Has any one ever given a good reason why he should have done this? Think now—think *hard*. To have done this would have been to have *terminated* an *interminable* climax. To have done this, God would have had to contradict himself ; i. e., he would have had to *extinguish* himself. It is blessedly inconceivable that we shall *ever* know God,

for to know him we would have to be his infinite equal. This would dissipate the fact of Godship, and would destroy the possibility of human happiness, which must always depend upon *advance*; that is, the realization of noble aspiration. Always approaching, but never reaching—this is the mode of moral evolution. It is a standard fact that the *satisfaction* of a desire is always *unsatisfying*. It is profoundly certain that things are exactly right, just as they are. The little “wrongs” of life in detail depend upon no cosmic fault, but upon our short-sightedness, *which* is necessary to our progress and happiness. It all dovetails just right, because our frailty is just as much a cosmic output, as is the environment related to it.

It has been shown that God could not make himself known to us except at the cost of his own existence; and then there would be no God to inform us even that he had been. All this is the consequence



of God's infinity—finite data are unrelatable to those of the infinite. So far, then, from it being possible for us to know God, it is impossible for us to even *know* that God is. It is therefore clear that only a *belief* in God is compatible with his existence; for to know that God is, is simultaneously to know that he is not. Here is the supreme fact in this connection: While it is impossible for God to make his existence known to us without sacrificing it, it is also impossible for us not to absorb sufficient evidence of his being, to justify our *belief* in it. This would seem to be because we are a part—a very small part—of his universal expression. The mediate, and possibly affirmative, as to evidence, are just sufficient to satisfy our capacities. It does not satisfy our needs, for, happily, they never can be more than partly satisfied. The chasm between knowledge and belief, in this mighty matter, is so vast, that the finite mind cannot

span it. We are not great enough to stand more than the *belief*; a positive knowledge of God would overwhelm, and annihilate us, because it would involve a direct relationship with the *unrelatable*. We speak of time and space as infinite, but we do not *know* what infinity is; because it is unthinkable. All this is exactly right, as I have said before; for it leaves to us that great, unspeakable, beckoning mystery upon which the progressive expansion of our souls must depend. To *know* is to have reached; to *believe* is to approach. We cannot live God, but we can, and do, live toward him. This is true of the vilest of us, for the Godward current is all-including.

How we can *believe* in the possibility of what we *know* can not be *realized* to us in fact, seems a subtle question. It will seem less intricate if we remember that, in the last analysis, *belief* is only a *confession of ignorance*. This, however, does not affect

its justification, and its sanity. Belief is never part knowledge—that is impossible. We either know, or we do not know. The fact is primary, and includes all intelligent possibility. The truth of these statements is not disturbed, therefore, by the fact that one may only partly know a language, a trade, or a profession, etc. Doubt is the mother of belief; doubtlessness the mother of unbelief; i. e., knowledge. We cannot simultaneously *know* and *believe* a thing. This would be partly to know, and partly not to know a thing—a self-contradiction. We know the sun shines—it is not a matter of belief. Belief always holds an element of doubt; knowledge never.

The varying concepts of God are interesting, as showing the differing degrees of individual enlightenment. No two persons have the same God, for God is a reflex of one's method of thought. The anthropomorphous God is a product of that mental primitiveness which cannot rise

above the grossness of coarsely material proximities. The fact of man's distinctness from each item of his environment, is responsible for the attribution of human finiteness, with its limitations, to deity. Man's inventiveness and constructiveness, together with his separateness from his creations, have begotten a habit of thought which makes it difficult for the untrained mind to seize the idea of the unconditioned. God's immanence is not a reality, but is merely a phrase to many. And too, the idea of God's impersonal ubiquity seems, to many, to lack the warmth and graciousness that pertain to current notions of him. Only the ripe and cultured intellect can have a just concept of deity.

Prayer and profanity are a direct outcome of the God fact. This is immeasurably reassuring, as will be instantly obvious. You could do neither without God, and as you can do either, therefore, God is. All of us pray ; all of us swear, i. e.,



abjure. Prayer is at once a confession of helplessness and a recognition of a higher power. Profane swearing is an admission of weakness and a confession to God. The weaker the man, the greater his profanity. Profane swearing is an oblique form of prayer. A great preacher in England understood it when he said from his pulpit : “God damn the policy of the unspeakable Turk !” Profane swearing is not sinful in *itself*—it is only vulgar. To say that a peculiar order of human thought and phonation disturbs the equanimity of God, is to commit an atrocious blasphemy—conceding that blasphemy is possible. Profane swearing, being coarse and vulgar, is ever to be reprobated. It cannot affect God, but it can injure man.

That we all pray, will not be denied. That we all swear, is equally true. Who has not scented as much venom in a preacher’s pshaw ! as he has in a sailor’s damn ? It is the soul of the word that

counts, not its articulate peculiarity. You can't cheat God by substituting "pshaw" for "damn," but for decency's sake say pshaw, and not damn.

Prayer, I should define as : *The appeal of an infinitesimal fraction of God to all the rest of God.* I should define swearing as *a noxious habit of speech.*

## CON X.

**T**HERE is such a large element of chance in natural manifestation, that we are justified in the conclusion that, at bottom, it is all chance. To illustrate : A man starts to go down town. By chance he takes Third street, though Fourth street would have done just as well. Just as he gets opposite a particular house, a chance gust of wind blows a loose brick off a chimney. By chance it falls just right to strike the man on the head and kill him. Who shall say this was all planned? Who

shall say it was not all pure chance? Perhaps half the natural events we observe are equally referable to chance, while it is reasonably certain that the other half depends upon chance, though less evidently so. Nature's scheme, or rather non-scheme, must be isomerous at least.

## PRO X.

THE LAST sentence of the foregoing *con* (and it is necessary to what precedes it) kills off the entire *con*. It is an admission that all cannot be chance unless Nature is *consistent*. Consistency and chance are opposed—they do not associate.

Now, although the fatalistic phrase, "What is to be, will be," is in some sort a solecism, still it carries a truth. Everything that happens, happens because it has to happen. The brick's fatal drop only expressed a proximal epoch in a se-

quential chain. The chain was under inflexible and immutable law. Law—control—*directs*, and a directed movement is not, and cannot be, a chance movement. The specific action of the brick represented the culminative manifestation of several converging elements, each of which was under the control of law. While this condensed expression was different from each of its elements, still it was their sum, so that if *it* was a lawful output, each of its elements was the same. In a word, chance is impossible, for its existence, not being subject to cause and effect, would have to depend upon *self-creation*—an absurdity. Even self-creation would have to depend upon cause and effect; so that pure chance is absolutely impossible.

Who has not seen hundreds of “chance pictures?” I have seen thousands of them. They are most frequently seen in the black and pink combinations of a grate fire. Many of these pictures are as nearly per-



fect as are those produced by the best skill of the best artist. Each of these "chance" pictures is a *cause-and-effect* product. It cannot be objected that this cause and effect is, itself, a chance one, for it is only one link of a chain that never began and will never end. There being no chance about it, how then shall we account for it!

There seems to be but one explanation, and that depends upon the fact of natural hedonic stress. It was shown in PRO I that beneficence dominates the universe. To demonstrate: Once in a life-time you may make a mis-step and sprain your ankle; but see how many millions of times you do not do it; and so it is with reference to everything else. Beneficence includes the ethical, the esthetic, and the hedonic. Universal and special mind are in touch, and are reciprocally related. As the picture, under pleasure-giving pressure, reads itself to you, so you read your-

self to it. Everything external to the ego is a quality of mentality, and *being* consists in interplay between universal and specific mind. Mountains, landscapes, trees, plants, flowers, etc., are pictured cosmic thoughts. "Chance" pictures are the same, only they are evanescent.

But was not the combination of circumstances in reference to the dropping brick a chance one in the sense that it was not planned? It was the kinetic expression of what had existed potentially in the constitution of things, and was therefore predestined. We cannot separate the idea of foreordination from that of intelligence—the thing *was* to be, and it *was*.

If this is fatalism, is the fact a deplorable one? Can you give any good reason why fatalism is incompatible with good citizenship, pure morals, high culture, amiability and happiness? In fact, is not that fearless, and comfortable resignation (recklessness?) characteristic of fatalists,

conducive to energy, success, and the enjoyment of life? With reference to successful *living*, is not the fatalist your true philosopher? Finally, does it not seem that if your immortality is a fact, it is such by predestination? Once the word "predestination," was the synonym of diabolism ; but thanks to the sweet sunlight of modern civilization, it is shorn of its horrent ugliness. Now the word, with its consequent and friendly fatalism, bears only healing in its meaning. Further on, fatalism in its relation to man's "moral responsibility" will be discussed.

## ADDITIONAL PROS.

**I** CAN recall no other *con* of any consequence. I find I have a number of *pros* left, which have no rebutting *cons*, and which are at least as strong, and (may I say?) convincing, as are those I have produced. They are as follows :

## PRO XI.

**T**HE whole truth is forever found in the mean—never in the extremes. The whole body of knowledge along any particular line of inquiry, may be diagrammed by an ellipse. The actual points of the ellipse hold absolutely no hint of its content. They are indistinguishable from any other mere points. As we move toward the center, the quantity of truth



increases till we reach the middle, where we get the maximum, or *whole* expression. Pure materialism represents one extreme ; pure idealism, the other, with reference to human destiny. Materialistic philosophy is cold, hard, and heartless. To be a materialist, is to be a pessimist. Pessimism is its own strongest protest against itself. Its spirit violates that natural conservation upon which depends the social structure, our self-perpetuation, our happiness, life itself, and in fact, the integrity of the universe. Pessimism is disintegrative, destructive—not integrative ; not constructive. Its usefulness, like that of other “evils,” is purely negative—it merely furnishes us something *to kick away from*.

Pure materialism is extreme, just as pure idealism is. We do not get the aggregate oscillatory value of the pendulum from a study of the extremities of its arc. These are dead-points, and are barren of

any but a negative value. They yield no living and dynamic truth. In a word, the abiding place of truth is always within the temperate precincts of the "golden mean."

Pure materialism (which does not recognize matter as mind,) is losing ground, just as pure idealism has long since done. The truth is, neither of them is adapted to sane, practical life. We cannot *live* either of them. So far as we here on earth are concerned, the test of any theory or philosophy, lies in its adaptability to the conduct of practical life. Dr. Maudsley, one of the most learned of materialists, says: "Not its origin, but *the way it works on the whole*, is the final test of a belief." In the Outlook of January 10, 1903, appeared an editorial article on this subject, which is remarkable, and almost singular, for its convincing method of statement. Following, I quote all but its introductory paragraph:

“There are in philosophy two contrasted skeptical theories: one, that there is no matter, all is mind; the other, that there is no mind, all is matter. It is not easy to refute either by pure reason; but neither works well in actual life. How do we know that matter exists? We see it and touch it. But this only means that certain sensations take place in us which we attribute to external causes. How do we know they are due to external causes? How do we know that we are not dreaming, that matter is anything more than a phantasmagoria, a succession of mental images, a series of pure imaginings? How does the materialist know that there is an electric battery? How does he know that there is a brain? The answer is, we have to live as though matter exists. This is the practical answer, and it is all-sufficient. If I think I am cold, the coldness may be only a ‘mortal thought,’ but I shall continue to think cold, until I can

think coal, and put it on what I think is a fire. The answer and the only answer, so far as we can see, to pure idealism, is that it does not work well; whether matter exists or not, we have to act as though it exists.

Similarly, how do we know that mind exists? We reason, feel, resolve, but how do we know that reasoning, feeling, resolving, are anything more than a phase of physical energy, a more subtle form of electricity, a material force generated by the brain? How do we know but that the statement of one of the older materialists is true, and that 'the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile?' The answer to this question is the same as the answer to the other. The theory of materialism does not work well. We cannot apply it to the conduct of life. As we have to act as though there were matter, so also we have to act as though there were mind. Physical forces are not sub-



ject to moral judgments ; we do not condemn gravitation as guilty of wrongdoing. Spiritual forces are subject to moral judgments ; we do condemn spiritual forces as guilty of wrongdoing. If a paper-weight falls off the desk and hits you on the knee, you do not think the paper-weight, or gravitation deserving of condemnation ; if a man throws a stone and hits you on the knee, you do think the man worthy of condemnation. Society could not go on, except upon the assumption that man is a free moral agent ; that his acts are not the necessary sequence of purely physical conditions ; that he deserves praise for some actions and blame for others. Except on this assumption, there could be neither government nor public opinion, neither good morals nor good manners. Civilization is based on the hypothesis that matter exists ; it could not go on upon any other hypothesis. Society is based upon the hypothesis that

mind exists ; it could not go on upon any other hypothesis. So long as a man acts as if there were matter, and as though there were mind, Society does not care what theories he broods in his study. But when a man acts as though matter had no real existence, we call him crazy. If he attempts to put his theories into practice, he is liable to be sent to the insane asylum. If he acts as though mind did not exist, and ignores all moral responsibility for his action, we call him immoral, and he is liable to be sent to the penitentiary. Neither pure idealism, nor pure materialism works. Life repudiates them both.

“We do not think there is much use in arguing with either the idealistic skeptic, or the materialistic skeptic. We never knew of much progress made in such arguments. It is best to let him play with his pet doll before his study fire as much as he likes. It is certainly not a living child, and cannot go out by itself and en-

ter into the actual tussles of life. To the idealistic skeptic we should simply say, 'Whether there is matter or not, you would better act as though matter is real or you will very soon come to grief.' To the materialistic skeptic we should say, 'If it be true that the brain secretes thought as the liver does bile, you would better see to it that your brain secretes the right kind of thought if you wish to enjoy the esteem of your fellow-man.' If what we call the life of the soul is inseparably bound up with the body, and ends when the body ends, still let us make this life high, pure, true, noble. Religion is *life*, and to all philosophical skepticism, whether of the pure idealist or pure materialist, our reply would be, Let us live as though life were real, life were earnest. It is not by the theories we brood in our studies, that we are to be tested, but by the life we live in the world of men.'"

Surely no further argument is needed to make it clear to the reader of average intelligence that truth is always to be found in the mean, not in the extremes. The mighty significance of this fact cannot be overestimated. It furnishes a fixed and fundamental basis from which to reason safely and confidently.

Now we will reason. To effectually lay the objections of querulous sticklers who might contend that the foregoing conclusion relative to truth and the mean, is not fully justified and final, I submit the following: So far as we know, life is the profoundest fact in existence—it is the *prime* fact. Without it there could be neither subjectivity nor objectivity. Life being the Supreme Fact, everything else in the universe is contributory, and subservient to it. Life then is *right*, if anything is right. In the philosophy of being, then, *whatever is integrative of existence is right*. This follows out of the constitution of



things, and beyond it there is nothing subject to human conception. It will be seen that in this connection, *right* and *truth* are synonymous terms.

Because the last conclusions of pure materialism and pure idealism are morally *disintegrative*, they are not right; in other words, *they are not true*. They do not conserve life, which, we have seen, is the *prime* fact, and therefore, the primal *truth*. Pure idealism, no less than pure materialism, is a philosophy of despair. In the former, the *summum bonum* of life is the achievement of Nirvana, that is, the auto-evolution of a supraphysical estate that assures annihilation. Materialism, by a logic at least as plausible as that of the idealist, also fetches up against annihilation in the end. Extreme materialism teaches annihilation as a final fact; extreme idealism teaches annihilation, or worse, as a final fact.

If the foregoing arguments and state-

ments are correct, and the right (the truth) is never found in an extreme, but always in the mean, then annihilation is not a philosophic truth. The probable truth with reference to our destinies abides somewhere, and somehow in the *mean*. This is represented by the consensus of the conclusions of all thinking people *excepting* the pure materialists and pure idealists. This vast aggregate conclusion, with all the countless absurdities and vagaries incident to it, embraces the doctrine of immortality. It directly contradicts the vital part of the extreme conclusions; and shall any one call it a chance coincidence? Shall any one deny that it is a *philosophic necessity*? To do this, he must first logically demonstrate that the theories of materialists and idealists work well in practical, every-day life, and also that these theories are *morally integrative*. It has been irrefutably shown that so far from working well in practical life, they

do not work *at all*, and that they are morally *disintegrative*. Add to this philosophic proof of immortality, the world's *instinctive expectation* of it; the soul's inherent *demand* for it, and the stress of evolutionary consistency with reference to man's destiny, and the mighty question seems to be put almost without the bounds of discussion.

## PRO XII.

**T**HE price principle is one of the fundamentals. To everything there is attached a price. This is a consequence of natural law, and *this* grows directly out of that reciprocity which is the underlying balanceive principle of all that is. Nature is as strict and exacting in her business methods as Shylock ever was. She always delivers the goods, and you cannot escape payment for them. There is no royal road to bad, any more than there is

to good, eminence—Nature is fair. We *must* pay the price; and this fact includes the facts of “free will” and “moral responsibility.” What is the price of our free will? It is the sacrifice of that *infallibility* which pertains to the “automatism” of the lower animals. The price paid for *ability to make mistakes* and to sin, is *inability* to do these things. So far from this ability being in conflict with that fatalism I have spoken of, it is a *result* of it. All that *is* was predestined, and that *controlled* function which we call “free will,” *is*. Included in, and inseparable from, this ability to err, is that which we call “moral responsibility.” If a particular act were not performed, then it was *not predestined*; wherefore the fact of predestination, though constant, unfailing, and specific, is *contingent* upon its verification. Playing forever within this *contingency*, is that illusive reality, “free will,” with its consequent “moral respon-



sibility." Let it not be objected that a non-occurrence is as much predestined as is an occurrence, for this would be impossible. Impossible for the reason that only nothing could lose itself in nothing. It is intrinsically impossible that what was not, might have been.

"Of all sad words of tongue or pen,  
The saddest are these: 'It might have been.' "

Although the sweet pathos of these lines involves a metaphysical solecism, who could wish the precious couplet unwritten?

To be more explicit in regard to God's sovereignty and man's free agency: The fact that ultimately, and unpractically, man is not responsible (to God), conforms to God's sovereignty and insures man's final weal. The fact that proximately and practically man is responsible (to man), conforms alike to God's sovereignty and man's "free will;" assuring, too, as it does, social possibility. God has ruled that (in a limited sense) man shall rule

himself, and the contingent phase of predestination puts him in partnership with God. This view, it seems to me, is reasonable. Certainly, such a truth would be at once worthy of God and honorable to man.

The price of man's destiny, is God's sovereignty; and despite that current ecclesiasticism which makes man the author of his own destiny, that destiny is in agreement with God's sovereign will. God being infinitely good, man's ultimate destiny cannot be bad. Even if God, as generally held, gave man absolute free agency (a thing which would be impossible without a contradiction of his sovereignty) he knew just what use man would make of it. To have put it within the power of his creatures to eternally damn themselves, *knowing* that almost all of them would do it; to have done this, when it would have been just as easy not to have done it, would have been directly to damn

them from the beginning! I know that religious creed-defenders split hairs on this subject, seeking to establish that God's foreknowledge is not equivalent to his foreordination. To admit that *there is no event* (which includes the means to it) *without God*; to admit this (and to deny it, is to deny the fact of Godship), is to admit that if any of us are damned, God is responsible for it. To admit that God is omnipresent (and to deny this, is to deny God), is to admit that he abides in hell amongst the damned, as much as any place else! What must be the diabolic needs of man-made creeds, that they necessitate such appalling blasphemies as these! What must have been the natural severity, the mystic credulity, and the self-contempt of Calvin, who could believe in predestined damnation, and still love God! The fact is, no human mind has ever been able to measure the monstrous savagery of the idea of eternal damnation.

Do just a little figuring for just a little bit, and you may catch a faint glimpse of its atrocity. Thus : To damn one soul a billion of years, is exactly equivalent to damning a billion souls for one year ; to damn one soul a decillion of years, is equivalent to damning a decillion of souls one year, and so on *interminably*. The horror of it is immeasurable, and inconceivable, for it amounts to the infinite damnation of an infinite number of souls ! Certainly then, it would be unimaginably more beneficent to annihilate us all, than to eternally damn *one* poor soul. Finally, as touching price : The price of existence without end, is existence without beginning ; and the price has been paid.



## PRO XIII.

**I**F THE conclusions of skeptical philosophy are true, then *life has no meaning*. It is very easy to show that life not only has meaning, but that it is all meaning. *Living* consists entirely in adjusting ourselves to the differences between meanings in detail. What would be the fate of a man to whom the meaning of prussic acid should be the same as that of water? This is only one illustration out of possible millions. Life then, represents the *sum* of meanings; and has it no significance beyond the mathematical feature of the case? The life principle, as we have seen, is as fundamental as is the law of gravity. It is more; it is all that makes gravity possible; for subjectivity takes

precedence of objectivity. Our life is a vital *part* of this mighty fundamental upon which the existence of the universe depends. Therefore life has meaning, unless the universe is meaningless, and the assumption that *it* (the universe) exists in vain, especially when nothing can *exist in vain*, is a tolerably presumptuous one. The fact that life has meaning, as shown, disestablishes the ultimate conclusions of the skeptical philosophers.

Whatever else it may be, life is a force. It is about certain that all the physical forces are interconvertible; as so markedly illustrated in electricity. This is not true of life. If it were convertible into some other force, then some other force would be convertible into it. But life is inconvertible and changeless. Life is derivable from only life. Symond says: "An eternity of life behind us, warrants an expectation of eternity of life in the future." Life being inconvertible, none of

it is lost in related phenomena ; so that the quantity of it in the universe is increasing. It cannot increase unless the lives of individuals are perpetuated intact. Of course this would seem to establish the immortality of the lower animals and of vegetation ; but do you object? If so, why? Would you be properly *you*, without a *natural* environment ; and are not all other things as much *of*, and as near *to*, God as you are? It is not impossible that the inherent stress of all that is below man, constitutes a question that is answered in perpetuated existence with expansive possibilities.

## PRO XIV.

**T**H E very existence of all things depends upon the knowability of all things. What is not known to exist, cannot, and does not exist ; for otherwise objectivity would be possible without sub-

jectivity. There is no occultism, except with reference to the finite mind ; there is no mystery not related to the human mind. This is because everything that exists is an intellectual expression, as seen hereinbefore. A tree is a manifested thought, just as a clock is ; unless an infinite series can be broken by a finite one. It is easily thinkable that the being and quality of a thing was not self-originated—it is unthinkable that it was self-evolved. The essence of each thing is self-justification ; because each thing is an expressed necessity. The idea of necessity is inseparable from that of fitness ; *which* is essentially an expression of reason first, and purpose second. There can be neither, unless there is a supreme intelligence.

The fact of supreme intelligence necessarily includes a knowledge of that fact. There has never been a being on earth who experienced such knowledge. Does any such being exist in any mere world?



Every system of whatever character, that we know anything of, has a head. In every aggregation of facts, there is a dominant one. It is even true that every *thing* has a head. Its central, or controlling fact is its head. It is impossible, therefore, for us to separate the idea of headship from the universe. The outcome of analogies points to a capital of the universe ; and we cannot disconnect the idea of this capital from that of a supreme ruler. The thought is a beautiful one ; and so far as human reason goes, it is logically justified. If the human mind is a part of the supreme mind, then capitalism with reference to the universe must be true, despite the fact that we seem to know that infinity can have no center. After all, though, such particularism in relation to destiny, is without the bounds of practical ratiocination—if it is reasonable that we shall exist after death, that is enough.

## PRO XV.

**A**LL that is, may be considered an aggregation of questions and answers. To illustrate : stinging insects constitute a question to which the mammal's tail is the answer ; fidelity is the question, trust is the answer ; love is the question, love is the answer, etc.

There is not, and cannot be, any answerless question. The question is made possible only by its answer ; i. e., the answer necessitates the question—question and answer are *complementarily* related to each other. To quote from myself :

In the concourse of cosmic events, at the end,  
The question's the answer's reply ;  
And reflected from somewhere in natural trend  
Is want, thrown back from supply.

The glorious peculiarity of these natural questions is the fact that the answer is

necessarily affirmative. The question's possibility depends upon the answer's affirmative certainty. So then,

That question which springeth for aye from the soul,

With its trembling hope, and its fear—

Shall it meet its response? Shall its parts merge in whole?

Shall endless procession end here?

#### PRO XVI.

**T**H E compensatory principle is an inexorable constituent of cosmic movement. It runs in exact parallelism with question and answer; so that the same set of arguments will do for both subjects. It will not be denied that, so far as we can see, compensation is inevitable. We must always pay, as we must always *receive* the price. No one can pay the price for us—not even Christ. Every sin committed *must* be expiated, else Nature contradicts herself; which as we have seen, is impos-

sible, unless it is possible for Nature to annihilate herself. The wretch who dies in the act of robbery or murder—how shall compensation reach him, unless he lives on? The hero who loses his own life in saving the life of another—how shall compensation reach him in this life? The compensative principle being as basic, and eternal as that of gravity, shall it be defeated? It may be objected that the *fact* of the murderer's depravity, is the *fact* of his compensation; the fact of the hero's nobility, is the fact of *his* compensation. With reference to the criminal's native bent, moral scope, and ultimate consciousness, this is *not* a fact. It is a fact in the abstract only, and its existence is merely relative, not positive. This is because the criminal cannot transcend himself. Again, compensation is not anticipatory of, but is sequential to, an act. It is a *consequence* of the act. It is dependent *upon* the act; for if the act miscarries, any satisfaction



that was derived from its contemplation, is offset by disappointment. In the cases cited, as both individuals died *in* their acts, there was no opportunity for compensation.

It might be further objected that the mind's capability of expanding a second into years—in extreme emergencies—would afford ample opportunity for compensation. But the mind's complete insulation always depends upon the supposed, or known *imminence* of death. The murderer might be shot in the head from behind; and the same is true of the peacemaker who is attempting to save the life of another. In such cases, there would be no opportunity for mental insulation. There could be no ante-mortem compensation in such cases; and, if death ends all, they would have to constitute *exceptions* to Nature's rule! Nature's rules have no exceptions; so, therefore, post-mortem compensation must be inevitable.

It may be objected that the compensatory principle in nature has no moral relationships ; that it is all physical. Gravity will kill the saint as certainly as it will kill the sinner ; lightning will strike the church as readily as it will strike the saloon, etc. But it must be remembered that the interrelations of mind and matter are such that moral effect attends every physical event. In a word, the supra-physical is as much an output of the cosmos as is the physical. Being such, its procession is as unbreakable as is that of the physical. If you put your hand in the fire—purposely or accidentally—a physical sin has been committed—that is physics. If you die in the act of committing murder, you have committed a moral sin, and it must be expiated. Nature's moral laws are as inflexible as her physical laws. This sin cannot be expiated in time ; it must, therefore, be paid for in eternity. There is no escape from this

conclusion, except under the assumption that Nature is capable of self-stultification ! The conscience is to moral acts, as the physical organism is to physical acts ; and its reactions (sooner or later) are as certain as are those of flesh and blood.

## PRO XVII.

**H**UMAN logic, pushed till it impinges on the unthinkable, recoils on itself, and is thus put out of associability with sanity. This is seen in impossible mathematical problems, and other things. The ultimate inferable conclusions of skeptical philosophy are not to be trusted, because the unthinkable is made to be a positive factor in the reasoning of the case. The tangles into which the employment of unthinkables in reasoning, will get us, may be illustrated thus : It is unthinkable that duration should have a limit ; therefore

we conclude it has no limit. But it is equally unthinkable that it has not a limit; shall we conclude, therefore, that it has a limit? In fact, (because we are finite) we cannot think of duration without—instinctively, if not intellectually—giving it a limit. The *same* logic, because dependent upon the unthinkable, drives us to opposing conclusions.

Such confusions result from attributing positivity to the unthinkable. In a more negative way, the unthinkable may be utilized in straight logic. For instance, it is unthinkable that the universe never had a beginning. It is equally unthinkable that it ever had a beginning. According to that ultimate finite logic which takes the unthinkable into positive account, neither hypothesis is tenable. But we do know, if we know anything, that *one* of them is true; and we know that this truth is in harmony with an ultra logic which is inaccessible to human perspicaci-



ty. As I have said before, it is competent, in argument, to use the *fact* of the *unthinkable*, or of *nothing*; but the attempt to use either in *fact*, is self-oblitative, because it attributes thingness to no-thingness. It is just to infer that the final conclusions of materialism—derived as they are from the reflexes of positively considered unthinkables—are contradicted by the ultra logic of the cosmos. This would seem to constitute a worthy argument in favor of immortality.

## PRO XVIII.

**I**F THE last conclusions of pure materialism, or pure idealism, are true, then it can be made to seem mathematically demonstrable that we do not, and never did exist. Their necessary assumption is that we had a beginning, and so, have an ending. According to their position, we—that is *we*—were nothing before

we were something, and we will end in nothing. The situation is reducible to the formula:  $— \div —$ . Now,  $— \div — = —$ . We are, therefore, *non est*. This argument is not fair, because it involves the relationing of *nothing* to *something*. But its *logical intent* holds a meaning that appeals *affirmatively* to our consciousness. The formula (a mathematical absurdity) merely furnishes a *graphic* illustration of the impossible situation to which one phase of applied materialism leads.

## PRO XIX.

**T**HIS has reference to the relation of science to religion. The old notion that there is a conflict between religion and science, has fallen back into a hungry oblivion. To say that religion and science disagree, is to say that each of them is opposed to itself; for science is one with religion. Science seeks to explain and to

put into utility the various phases of cosmic expression, and the latter is all that binds us to God. Science, in wading into the sea of mystery, at last "gets over its head," and then it is purely religion. It always travels toward God, as it ever must.

It is Science, and its congener, Philosophy, that has forced our profoundest thinkers to their knees in relation to the religious principle. Darwin's vast reaches toward the ultimate drove him at last into that Eternal Verity we call God. The same is true of Herbert Spencer. Who does not remember Spencer's mighty conclusion, logically expressed out of the Persistence of Force (Conservation of Energy)? Thus:

"Hence the force of which we assert persistence, is that Absolute Force of which we are indefinitely conscious, as the necessary correlate of the force we know. By the persistence of force we really mean the persistence of some Cause

which transcends our knowledge and conception.

“Thus, quite unexpectedly, we come down once more to that ultimate truth, in which, as we saw, Religion and Science coalesce,” etc.

The fact of the Conservation of Energy is not inimical to the hope of immortality, because the individualism of the psychic entity (having always existed) is as intrinsic to the constitution of things as the principle of conservation itself. It is half believed by a few modern philosophers that the “doctrine” of the Conservation of Energy is doomed to demolition! The peculiarities of radium have done it. It is claimed that although it emits light and warmth continuously, it loses nothing; also that it is not possible that it feeds on the air or anything it contains. The idea strikes the average mind as tolerably ridiculous. To the usual reasoner, it would seem about infinitely more probable that



no balance of sufficient delicacy can be devised for the case, than that radium simultaneously *does*, and does *not* part with substance. It will take more than radium to disestablish the fact of conservation.

The clashing of Geology with Genesis merely represents the difference between modern enlightenment and the ignorance and superstition of primitive times. Who, in this age, shall say Genesis is right, and Geology is wrong? Science may destroy all the religious *creeds* on earth, but it will only strengthen *religion*. Lord Kelvin says: "Every act of Free Will is a miracle to physical, and chemical and mathematical science." This is to belittle science; for if science is not the word of God, (there being a God), what is it? All the utterances of the Kosmos are inconceivably religious, for they hold those deep, eternal meanings, which *are* religion. The statement is as much more than rhetoric,

as Nature's earnestness is surer than anything else we know.

Geology is one long sermon, whose text and affirmation is God, Design and Immortality. Is it probable that the carboniferous era, for instance, merely *happened* to antedate human possibility? We get such questions out of this sermon. Astronomy preaches the same eternal sermon. What reverent mind cannot see through the magnitudes and majesties of Astraland the awful doubtlessness of enthiasm, and the very final in purposeful tremendousness? It is blasphemy to discount Science in religious relationships.

In this connection I want to present a fact which rises above practical science ; it is too great and momentous to be scientifically classifiable. It has reference to supply timeliness in relation to those needs upon which our existence depends. Why is it that flowers and fruits and vegetables do not *all* mature at the *same time*? Why

are they so rotated as to exactly fit our needs? As to the fruits: first strawberries, then raspberries, then gooseberries and currants, then blackberries, then peaches, then melons, then plums, then apples, etc. Other minor fruits, such as hackberries, haws, May-apples, pawpaws, etc., are sprinkled through as a divertisement, and *actually* in subservience to the predatory spirit of boyhood. The vegetables observe the same timeliness. First peas, then early potatoes, then green beans, then butter beans, then tomatoes, then sweet potatoes, then green corn, then cabbage, etc. Lettuce, asparagus, squashes, egg-plant, celery, spinage, etc, are sprinkled through the standards with perfect judiciousness. Note that these fruits and vegetables are precisely adapted to our warm-weather dietetic needs, and particularly note that those stronger, more heat-producing vegetables ripen late, and *will keep over winter*, and until the early gar-

den products will take their place ! Does this arrangement represent a feat of fortuity ? To assert this, it seems to me, is to advertise oneself a lunatic.

It may be objected that it is merely a question of adaptation ; that if it had *happened* that all vegetables and fruits matured at the same time, man would have necessarily been adapted to the condition, since vegetables, etc., are a *part* of the environment that produced him. If we ask the objector *why* this is true, the only answer possibly available to him would be—“because.”

In its application to this question, the fact of design answers it completely and satisfactorily. Design is as much a natural fact, and is in as constant evidence as is the fact of gravity. Each individual's volition is dictated and controlled by design—a design originated by his environment, not by himself. Varying combinations of circumstances are the originators of our



designs, and these combinations are subject to natural law. To originate a design, one would have to *exceed* himself! Design pervades the universe, just as gravity does. We do not doubt the verdicts of gravity; how then shall we doubt either the *fact*, or the verdicts of design, seeing especially that these verdicts confirm their mother fact, even as those of gravity confirm their mother fact?

There are a few questions which, so far as I can see, are unanswerable under any other hypothesis than that there is *purpose* back of all natural manifestation. Thus: Why do bees make enough honey to supply both themselves and man? Why do hens lay enough eggs to fully perpetuate their kind, and amply supply man? Why do horses wholly sacrifice themselves for man's weal? These are questions that demand unprejudiced answers.

Will it be objected that the enlarged functions, etc., of these animals are the

result of domestication, culture, etc.? The objection recoils upon itself as an *objection*, and becomes a confirmer of my contention. It is true that the extraordinary development of flowers, fruits, vegetables and animals is the result of culture. How is it done? It is done by an *intelligent manipulation* of environment. Man, having a *mind*, is capable of utilizing natural environment as an *instrument*, or *medium* through which to accomplish desired results. He is large enough to create a proximate, local environment, but he is not large enough to create a remoter and general environment.

To illustrate this matter, we will suppose that an intelligent and curious Martian drops into my study. He asks questions which I try to answer.

Ques. Where do bees, hens, cows and horses come from?

Ans. They are the result of enviroanal pressure.

Q. Why do they provide for themselves?

A. Because of environal pressure.

Q. Why do they *anticipate* future needs with present over-supplies?

A. Environal pressure.

Q. Why do they supply, not only their own needs, but also man's needs?

A. Environal pressure.

Q. Why does environment do all this?

A. Because it cannot do otherwise.

Q. Why cannot it do otherwise?

A. All the prime, and large, supplies of man's needs just *chance* to *have* to *happen* to exist. All of his more proximate needs, such as honey, milk, eggs, completely developed flowers, fruits, vegetables, animals, etc., do not *happen*, but are *compelled* by the force of *purpose behind* their environment, *which*, in this case, represents merely a *means* to an *end*.

Q. Your answer with reference to man's proximate supplies, is perfectly clear. It commends itself to my understanding as

being entirely sane and philosophic ; but why does not the same philosophy apply to man's first-hand needs, especially as Nature is coherent throughout, and the *same* ultimate method controls the universe?

A. I give it up.

It is needless to say that the Martian would go away a much befuddled man.

According to skeptic philosophy, there is no *adaptation* about it, for that would imply design. It is all the consequence of the stress of cosmic potentiality (a potentiality that exists without a reason). Man is a *common* part of natural expression, and, as such, *has* to fit in with the rest.

Now these statements resolve themselves into a generalized assumption, which depends for its existence upon the necessity of ruling out design. It classes that precedent half of the universe which is all that makes the other half possible, with the mere elements that are common to



man and his environment. Otherwise, in spite of itself, it predicates intelligence of man's environment; since adaptation is fundamental to evolution. That is all that can be asked; and that is the point at which philosophy always merges into religion. There is no process of reasoning by which it can be made intelligible that the "inherent" (mindless) laws of nature are capable of prophecy and providence.

Man is a verified prophecy. This fact is written out in a *climacteric* series which has run through uncounted æons. Did the prophecy originate in nescient potentiality? Is the idea of potentiality itself consistent with that of nescience as its essence? What made the very *idea* of potentiality, or prophecy, possible to man, if this same potentiality did not do it? Then shall the actual contradict the potential? The fact that man *had* to fit his environment stands unquestioned. If,

however, there is no *reason* why he had to fit it, then he did *not* have to fit it. The fact that he does have to fit it, proves, therefore, that there is a reason for it. If there is a reason for it, that is all we can ask ; for then the scheme was *reasoned* out, and this necessitates purpose, design, etc. If man is a part of nature, and nature is congruous throughout, then the fact that man demands reasons, depends upon the fact that nature supplies reasons. The supply fact is all that makes the demand fact possible ; so that the demand fact is subsequently related to the supply fact. From all of which I conclude that man is neither an accident, nor an incident, but is a verified prophecy.

Here I want to call attention to a very remarkable book. I refer to the recently published work of Rev. Minot J. Savage, entitled "A Belief in God." It has not been blazoned to the world like "Trilby" and a few scores of later works, because *it*

merely seeks to establish the unimportant facts of God and immortality. It is solid logic all through, glorified by the graces of jeweled speech. The purpose of this masterly work is to establish theistic probability on a *scientific* basis. It enjoys a lonesome eminence, in the fact that not one argument in the book is based upon an assumption. The man who knows there is such a book, but fails to purchase it, and read, and re-read it as he never read his bible, is treating himself shabbily indeed.

The book ends with an address which had been delivered to a Greek letter society by Dr. W. H. Savage, a brother of Dr. Minot J. Savage. The title of this address is, "The Intellectual Basis of Faith." I should say that this man's treatment of his subject has never been even nearly equaled by any other writer. The address, as a whole, besides being absolutely unique in logical method and

force, is a literary gem. It seems to me it has never been surpassed in clean-cutness, and in those nameless interverbal incidences which give virility and polish to a literary product.

I wish I had room to quote at length from this address. As it is, I shall quote just a few of those passages which run in direct line with my contention, that Man is a verified prophecy. To forestall any attempted demolition of further argument (on the ground that we must not try to get without the scope of positive knowledge), I quote the following :

“How we shall make passage from man’s nature and history to a knowledge of the spiritual powers that have been and are creating him, no one may be able now to say. But no man is authorized by any scientific fact or law to say that the passage cannot be *made*. To the objection contained in the statement that we cannot deal with what lies beyond our experience,

it is sufficient to say that all growth comes into contact with what was beyond the former experience."

I quote further :

"Now, I think there will be small dissent from the statement that man's religious nature is as much a distinct *fact* as his eye or ear; a fact, too, not to be confounded with its accidents. The products of this nature are as real as any building or pyramid or mountain. The essential elements in the ideas of God, duty, truth, right, immortality, seem as much matters of course in the order of nature as the secretions of bodily organs or the depositions of rock strata.

"These things being so, they require to be accounted for. No scientific account of the world can be complete that does not account for these 'ideas,' and their influence in history, fairly and adequately.

"Now it is simply scientifically inconceivable that man should have become



what he is, unless these results of history were either ordained in the germ—in which case, essential theism with its logical accompaniments is granted—or produced by a spiritual environment, involving as much as we mean by Theism.”

One more passage :

“ Man is a result. He has been *made*, somehow, *all of him*. He cannot transcend his cause. The force that has shaped the highest in him may be harder to find than that which shapes his physical growth, yet none the less it must exist.”

This is it : Man’s religious nature is as much a *part* of cosmic expression as is any material thing. Let it not be objected, as is the fashion, that this is equally true of man’s anti-religious nature, as an outcome of which he commits all manner of sin. The counter would be an annihilator if it were only true. That man has an anti-religious nature, is flatly contradicted by his history. That he has a religious

nature, is past question. Now will some philosopher explain to me how man can have *at once* a religious, and an anti-religious nature? It has been shown that the possibility of "badness" constitutes the possibility of "goodness." The great fact of relativity accounts for all of this; and whether a man is good or bad has no relation to the fact that he has a religious nature. Out of the Mystic Deeps, all other questions receive an affirmative response—does *this* natural question constitute an exception?

## PRO XX.

**T**H E following proposition has nearly the force of a *con*:

There is not, and never has been, a *reasonable* religion in the world. An unreasonable religion requires an unreasonable God—an impossibility. Religion as a *fact*, therefore, has never been possible. Reli-

gion having always been false, it is not surprising that its past is written in blood and tears.

Up to within recent times, every word of the foregoing statement was strictly true. That the vital part of it is not true now, I shall try to make manifest in what follows.

It has been seen in PRO VIII that the probabilities are about ninety-nine for, to one against, the certainty of the ego's essential distinctness from the brain. This conclusion finds a natural correlate in those unquestioned psychic facts which merge into telepathy. The fact that these psychic truths do this, completes a logical circle which puts the question of the mind's distinctness from the brain beyond controversy. Among the intelligent and thoughtful, the fact of telepathy is as firmly settled as is that of the earth's sphericity. Scores of instances of it have fallen within my own observation; and

this is just as true of millions of others.

Within three months my family and I have been witnesses to an instance of mind transference which, if it stood alone in history, would necessarily be conclusive evidence in the question. We have a neighbor—a highly cultured and refined lady; wife of a minister—who is a psychic sensitive. I have seen many confirmations of this, but none of them has been so startling and pronounced as was the one I shall now present. One morning this lady awakened in a dreadful fright. She had dreamed that she was in bed with an infant, and that she had lain on it and smothered it to death. She was greatly agitated, and she trembled violently as she told her dream to her husband, who had been awakened by her scream. This happened at about five o'clock in the morning. On the next day, a man who lived two blocks away, called on the min-

ister to secure his services at a funeral. He informed the clergyman that on the day before, at about five o'clock in the morning, his wife on awakening, discovered, to her horror, that she had lain on her infant in such a way as to smother it to death!

“Chance coincidence,” shall some one say? Shall he say this, remembering that the lady is a sensitive, who has had hundreds of experiences similar in character to this one? Would not a plethoric series of such “chance” coincidences, running from childhood up to the age of thirty-seven, be much more marvelous than is the fact of telepathy itself, especially when there is no such thing as chance?

The planchette owes its distinctive peculiarity, and therefore its existence, to the fact of mind transference alone. Shall any one deny that the planchette is a fact? This toy (?)—the despair of the scientists—embodies in its possibilities one of the



profoundest, and most momentous of occult truths. It demonstrates the actual and material *contagiousness* of different mind tones. It proves that, under properly sympathetic conditions the molecules of one mind come into contact with those of another mind, and that they are capable of absorbing from each other differing thought atoms, or aggregations of them. The fullest explanation of the planchette principle given by any dictionary, is that its movements are "controlled by the dominant idea." No dictionary that I have consulted tells whether this dominant idea pertains to the sitters alone, or to them and others, etc. The fact is that the more people there are in the room, the better the little machine works. This is because the more people there are in a given space, the greater is the quantity of mentality in that space ; and consequently, the larger is the supply of that material to which the animal magnetism of the sitters makes the

instrument sensitive. The sitters are at once media for, and participants in, thought-projection. If the dictionary explanation of the planchette principle is rather scant, it at least recognizes the fact of mind transference. Telepathy is a fixed and eternal fact.

The idea that the spirit world is separated from this one only by a thin veil, accords with right reason and with the steady trend of our profoundest instincts. There are two strong analogic reasons for this, namely: the facts that the greater forces and conditions are invisible, and are directly related to us. It is true that no force nor condition is *materially* visible to us; but my *meaning* will hardly be misinterpreted. Our habit of ultra-thought, which is directly sequential to the natural bent of things, is in alliance with the idea of the other world's nearness. We *feel* that the departing soul merely steps from the Here to the Beyond. It would be in

perfect consonance with the method of evolution, if the difference between the Here and the There should depend on vibratory rates, possibly including the practicalized fourth dimension. Such a hypothesis is thoroughly reasonable.

There is, however, a still stronger proof of the nearness of the spirit world. This proof is derived from death-bed experiences. It is a matter of common knowledge that many, in the supreme moment of dissolution, act and talk as though the reciprocal stress of the awful event had rent the veil for them. They catch a rapturous glimpse of the sweetness and light of the "Echoless Shore," with dear ones there in beckoning and greeting attitudes. I have seen many a dying face glorified by this transcendent vision—if merely vision it is. It is graciously notable that this experience is not peculiar to professed religionists. To the orthodox creedist, alas! this fact would discredit the genuineness

of the blessed vision ; but he must confess, after all, that God is infinitely good, and that his impartiality in the case would fall far within the limit of *illimitable* goodness.

Now first, we have the fact of telepathy ; next, the fact of the spirit world's nearness ; and next, the consistency and eternity of evolution. The juncture of these facts would seem to make it next to certain, that intercourse between mortals and the immortals, is a present, or coming reality. Very many thousands of very sane, and very thoughtful people, including a number of great scholars and scientists, have been carried by these and more practical proofs—as they claim—into the conviction that the reality referred to, is a present one.

Such a religion—being the straight output of evolution, and being in harmony with our noblest concept of deity—has the lonesome merit of reasonableness at least. The details of this faith, relating to one's



standing, method of life, enlarged opportunities, etc., in the next world, are in strict correspondence with the first-hand facts derived directly from God's own book—that book which is not subject to Higher Criticism. None of them *conditions* God, nor shocks our sense of the right—they are *reasonable*. Only a reasonable religion can reciprocate with a reasonable God. It follows that only a reasonable religion can be the true religion. Let it be noted that no religion is reasonable, which requires a different quality of logic from that which governs us in our daily lives. *The highest man's highest sense of the reasonable, is not too high for God; the best man's best scheme of human destiny, is not too good for God.* Excepting the faith I have outlined, is there a reasonable religion in the world? All other religions are “above reason,” and therefore *above the source of reason*; for the potential of reason is necessarily exactly equaled by the



potential of its source. To talk about anything being above reason, is to talk the sheerest nonsense, of course. Faith—"intuitional" conviction—is included in the fact of intellect, and is a product of reason. Faith is the result of a convincing appeal; and, whether worded or not, this appeal is made up of what is accepted as evidence. There could be no faith; there could not be *anything*, if there were no such thing as reason. Reason is above all that is.

The fact of this religion—it being the legitimate outcome of straight philosophy and strict morality, and embracing, as it does, the broad doctrine of God's fatherhood and man's brotherhood—constitutes in itself, as it seems to me, an irresistible *pro*. I think no fair-minded independent thinker will deny that it brings into evidence *one* reasonable faith; thus discrediting the *con* against which it is pitted.

Note that this religious system is direct-

ly God-given. It is written out by God's own finger in a chain of mighty facts, which are a thousand times more nearly indisputable, than are those pertaining to any other religion in the world. To me, the conclusion seems inevitable, that if there is a true religious philosophy in this world, the one I have outlined must be that one. If it shall be voted heinously presumptuous for me to thus assume to specifically point out the right religion, I take refuge in the accommodating and commodious fact that *all* men do exactly the same thing. One thing is certain, and that is, that the world is rapidly drifting into that breadth and liberality of constructive thought, out of which shall arise that beautiful temple of God, whose doors shall be wide enough for all humanity.

## PRO XXI.\*

**T**HIS shall be the last of my *pros*, though there are a number of others which are worth considering. In fact, all the roads in synthetic philosophy lead to a *pro* in reference to immortality. With PRO XXI, which I have ventured to believe is unique at least, I shall close this series ; my booklet having already become larger than I had intended it should. This *pro* will be peculiar on account of its logical

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\* A very competent critic has suggested that as this *pro* practically nullifies all that precedes it, either it, or all the rest should be left out. My purpose has been to establish the fact of immortality. To a class, what precedes PRO XXI will be sufficient ; to another class, nothing less than this *pro* will suffice ; while alas ! to another class, not even it will be convincing. To those who require PRO XXI, all the rest of the argument will be waste matter ; to those who do not require it, it will be a mere curio. I have written for all.

isolation, and its independence in relation to the usual trains of philosophic thought. I have never happened to see a hint of it in any of my readings. Certainly its employment has not been common.

The force of this *pro* will depend upon the *exhaustibility of variety*. The nature of the argument based upon this is such that if all the foregoing arguments are false, and even if it be a fact that there is no God, still immortality is absolutely assured. All that is required is the establishment of the fact that variety is exhaustible. It seems certain that the base of variety is always limited. If this is so, its expression cannot be infinite. Thus, the basis of musical variability consists of seven tones and four half tones, eleven tones in all. Though the possible relations derivable from these run into billions, they cannot be infinite, for their source is finite. Young as humanity is—



so far as we know—no composer can produce a wholly original tune. So far from that, he cannot more than two-thirds, or one-half, do so. This is true of all other bases of variety. The socio-moral elements of fiction seem to be three-fourths exhausted. Who shall write a half original novel? There is an ocean of difference between the exhaustion of the *newness* of a simple element, and the exhaustion of the *individuality* of a complex unit. The newness of the word, “the” was practically exhausted with its first use; it has no individuality, for all the’s are the same. You, dear reader, are an individual, and your individuality has never been duplicated.

Touching the exhaustibility of variety, if it is a fact that it is even a *little* more difficult for the composer, the novelist, or the poet to do original work than it was three thousand years ago, that establishes the exhaustibility of variety. We have

seen that it is much more than a little more difficult. It seems true then, that variety is being exhausted ; and if this is true, various possibility is not infinite. I submit that the *practical* fact that variety is being exhausted (which could not be true if variability were infinite), demolishes the mere theory that matter is infinitely divisible. Even that theory is not fatal to the exhaustibility of individuality, for differences too fine to be cognizable to the human intellect, would, so far as we are concerned, have *no* existence. There is no thing whose margin is not infinitely related, but that fact only proclaims our divine origin. The idea of difficulty—much more of *increasing* difficulty—in effecting new combinations, is not compatible with that of infinite resource. This is practical—not theoretical.

Every individual is the product of a varied draft upon original resource. A time must come when the source (not being

infinite) will be exhausted. What then? The boundless, eternal billow of potentiality goes on forever. It is everlastingly the same. Exactly what it has produced, it *must* produce again. You, dear reader, are an individual. You will be reproduced *some* time. What if you do not come into existence again for ten billions of years? That period will be no more to you than would be ten seconds. You go to sleep in death, and—so far as you are conscious—immediately awaken into new being. It may be objected that we could not be exactly reproduced, unless every minute detail of our environment were synchronously brought into being. The *invisible* detail of our environment can have no effect upon our personality. On account of the differing terms of exhaustibility, it is about certain that *in detail* many features of our environment are constantly changing, but this does not disturb the mass effect. It is the mass effect that contributes toward

our individualism. To us, grass is grass, whether any of its blades have been duplicated or not. The same is true of trees and all other natural objects. This terracing scheme—the result of exhaustive variability—even if it affects the mass, is in strict consonance with natural conservation, and so, with evolution. You will continue to progress, for you will reap all the benefits of this life's mistakes. But whether our mental acumen, and our ingenuity are equal to all the subtleties in the case or not, can make no difference—*if* it is a fact that our individualities will be reproduced, and even a fact that our environal relations will be quite changed, these facts will *somehow* harmonize. Nature will see to that.

The most rational objection to the theory would inhere in the question: Why have we not been reproduced in the past? The time has been long enough, for it has been infinitely long.



Now, in the practical sense, has it been infinitely long? The difference between time and space consists in this: Space is absolutely infinite—it has neither beginning nor end. Time always has *one* end, the proximal end; i. e., the present. Duration always is, and always will be, making for infinity (just as we are doing) but it will never attain it. Futurity, though absolutely assured, *does not exist*, and has never been an accomplished fact. The peculiarity of time is that it is eternally self-creating—it is at once limited and unlimited. In this peculiarity abides that logos which adapts duration to evolution. Time is the sufficient and eternal type of *onwardness*. If time were infinite in the same sense as that in which space is infinite, then evolution would have been impossible. Time is *progressiveness*, and progressiveness is evolution; so that evolution is coincident with that trinity of all trinities—Past, Present and Future. This

being the nature of evolution (progressiveness coincidently with that of time), alternate cycles of involution do not express retrogressive interruptions. If time has always been, evolution has always been, and, with time, always will be. If we, in parallelism with evolution, have existed potentially *always*, can anyone give a sane reason why we should have merged into self-consciousness before now, especially as all of the past (if "all" will apply) is not even a fraction of *forever*? So far as eternity is concerned, our mergence into self-consciousness might have been postponed decillions of years yet without making a particle of difference. In fact, *no* objection is pertinently considerable, if the exhaustibility of variety can be established; for that covers all objections, and everlastingly settles the whole question. It is proper to say here, that the soul's *requirement* of immortality—having its cor-

relate in the *fact* of immortality—could suffer no disturbance as a consequence of the *method* of immortality. Note particularly that, evolution being an eternal fact, reversion of our individualities to inchoate or primitive estates will be impossible. It is the last conclusion of higher philosophy, that the process of the greater Kosmos consists in an eternal succession of evolutions and involutions. What is evolution, but an exhaustion of variety; and what is involution, but a potentialization of this variety? The universe is completely involved in this mighty fact. From all the suns and worlds down to the minutest detail, this fact is manifest. It is all, according to Spencer, an endless series of integrations and disintegrations; but he gives no *reason* for it. The *reason* inheres in that *repetition* which is necessitated by the exhaustion of variety. Because reason is, there is *a* reason for everything that is.

This *pro* is seriously submitted, for serious consideration.

## ULTRA PRO.

**I**T HAS been seen that the aggregate trend of things is affirmative of immortality. The *things* are included in the ultimate verdicts of science, the common social experiences of mankind, and the philosophy of history. According with natural consistency, the total sum of expressions converges into coalescence with our *seventh* sense. (The sixth sense is that muscular quality through which we apprehend the fact of gravity.) The seventh sense is that physico-spiritual endowment through which we *feel* the necessity and certainty of continued existence. This sense constitutes the supreme touch of man's personal equipment. It is the connecting link between temporal and eternal life.



The *fact* of this sense is beyond rational doubt. It has been affirmed and confirmed through all the ages ; not as a *sense*, but as a psychic function. Scientists, ever timid and hesitating in classifying facts which are not obtrusively self-pronounced, have left this to the care of professional religionists. It is, and always has been, recognized as a psychological (and therefore scientific) *fact*, but has not been named a *sense*.

The senses are *first facts*—First True Facts. They differ from the “First Truths” of intellectual philosophy, in being *wholly* original, fundamental and life-serving. They are *properties* of intelligent being, whereas the First Truths are fundamental *convictions*. Conscience and intuition are at least partly acquired—*belief* is almost wholly acquired. These statements exhibit the relative importance of our native endowments, special or not. It is seen that the special senses are genetically re-

lated to animal existence. They precede the possibility of self-conscious being.

The difference between the special senses and the other special endowments, may be clearly defined. The special senses are immediate, direct, indispensable, directly life-serving, constant and common to the race. The others are not. The special senses co-ordinate perfectly ; being severally and collectively homogeneous to the physical and mental organisms. Other special <sup>org.</sup>endowments do not co-ordinate perfectly, and therefore they make for in-harmony. An exaggerated talent is such at the expense of the other talents. Genius is a talent exaggerated to a phenomenal degree ; and he who is a genius, is always lop-sided.

We have, then, two classes of special endowments. One is constant, common, life-serving, etc. ; the other is not, and is exceptional. There are only these *two* classes of special endowments ; and what does

not fall within one of these classes, necessarily falls within the other. The demand for, and expectation of, continued existence, is in *harmony* with the other senses, is *constant*, and is *common* to mankind. Thus it is as clearly a sense as is any one of the other six senses. It *classifies itself* with the special senses.

Now the possibility of a sense depends upon the *certainty* of its justification. We could not see, if there were nothing to be seen; nor hear, if there were nothing to be heard. This fact is necessary to the very nature and constitution of sensibility. Apply this absolute fact to that other absolute fact—the seventh sense—and the certainty of immortality is seen to be one of the First True Facts.

The seventh sense is a necessary expression of evolution. The office of evolution may be defined to be the fitting of oncoming facts to their pre-existing complements. We call this process of adapta-

tion, *evolution*. The fact of immortality has always existed ; and this fact *demand*ed the seventh sense, just as the fact that objects reflect light, *demand*ed vision.

Note the ascending scale of refinements as exhibited in the special senses. Closest to the grossness of earth-life, is the gustatory sense—specially life-serving. Next, touch ; next, gravity ; next, audition ; next, olfaction ; next, vision ; and last, ultra-vision. The whole conforms to the swelling scheme of things, addressing itself gratefully and authoritatively to our most enlightened conception of fitness. In it is represented a climacteric series, the farther half of whose final term burns in the Beyond. This seventh sense is all that makes possible such bursts of supernal passion and prophecy as the following from the glowing pen of that incomparable prose-poet, Dr. Ralcy Husted Bell—who is profoundly innocent of regulation religion :



“He is an old man now. Grief and Time and the World have exacted their toll. His frail flesh they have not spared ; and on his dear face they have left their autographs and return notices. And sealed up within the heart of Fate lies the final summons dated and signed by the Master.

“These are the things then, that disturb mortals. If these things were all, Love’s heart would burst. But in the presence of a reverent philosophy love borrows hope from the light of stars and a merri-ment from the joy of day. There is within the season’s change some subtleness that wakes responses from the far-away. Adown the farthest tracks of light it comes, and up from the pulsing deeps.

“Thus hope suspires from the earth and rains from the sky. From the petals of a shattered rose and from a smile on the lips of the dead, dream-shadows rise endowed with life. There is within the common fate of all a promise and a prophecy that all shall be well for all that is, and that each shall have at last its very own.”

## APPENDIX.

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### THE CLERGY.

**I**N CLOSING, I should like to make an appeal to the ministry. It is their peculiar function to conserve good morals and social order. I should think they would want to impress into service every means that makes for righteousness. It seems to me that it should be evident to them by now, that a very large field outside of conventional pulpitism is beckoning them. The defection of men with reference to the church, I should think, should hold a profound but readily explicable significance to them.

Fifty years ago there were, within a ra-

dius of three miles from where I now sit, six churches, and all these were actively alive and amply supported. Only one is left, and it is moribund. The population is six times greater now than it was fifty years ago. The congregation of this lone church is now mostly made up of women and children, there being only one man to every five or six women. This represents a decadence (which is not the right word) of six or eight hundred per cent., at least. There is a reason for this, and it is not because men have deteriorated in the religious sense, for the moral tone of this community is very much better than it was in that elder day. What is true of this community is, to a greater or less degree, true of the whole country.

This is a very solemn fact as concerning church organization. What shall the clergy do about it? Shall they realize that in this enlightened age men reason and think along religious lines; that they do not

now put in abeyance that logic (all the logic we have) which they *must* apply to the affairs of this life? Shall they still stick to crazy creeds and the gross materialism of ancient orthodoxy? Shall they still try to adapt a mediæval mode of religious thought to this age; still try to fit a square peg into a round hole? Do they feel that civilization is so far ahead of the pulpit that it is useless for the pulpit to try to catch up? Don't they know that the religious instinct is just as strong in men as it ever was, and that the souls of men are crying out for a church-home in which they could feed upon the wholesome, the sweet and the beautiful of religious thought? Don't they know that if they would adopt the practice of delivering, or of having delivered, on alternate Sabbaths, extra-scriptural religio-philosophic discourses, they would soon fill their auditoriums with serious, thoughtful men? And don't they know that in time




the liberal element, by brain dominance and numerical superiority, would absorb the back-age remnant?

The time is not quite ripe yet for this reform to be wrought through an independent movement. The prestige of church institutionalism, with the consequent technical authoritativeness of the ordained prelate, would be necessary to the defiance of that fixed conservatism along this line, which more or less controls us all. It is up to the preachers. They must widen our church doors. It is certain that church disintegration will continue till religion is liberalized into harmony with the enlightenment of this luminous age.

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